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People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension
to Privacy and Technology Scholarship
M. Ryan Calo*
This article updates the traditional discussion of privacy and
technology, focused since the days of Warren and Brandeis on the
capacity of technology to manipulate information. It proposes a novel
dimension to the impact of anthropomorphic or social design on privacy.
Technologies designed to imitate people-through voice, animation,
and natural language-are increasingly commonplace, showing up in
our cars, computers, phones, and homes. A rich literature in
communications and psychology suggests that we are hardwired to react
to such technology as though a person were actually present. Social
interfaces accordingly capture our attention, improve interactivity, and
can free up our hands for other tasks.
At the same time, technologies that imitate people have the potential
to implicate long-standing privacy values. One of the well-documented
effects on users of interfaces and devices that emulate people is the
sensation of being observed and evaluated. Their presence can alter our
attitude, behavior, and physiological state. Widespread adoption ofsuch
technology may accordingly lessen opportunities for solitude and chill
curiosity and self-development. These effects are all the more dangerous
in that they cannot be addressed through traditional privacy protections
such as encryption or anonymization. At the same time, the unique
properties of social technology also present an opportunity to improve
privacy, particularly online.
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INTRODUCTION
What if your every Internet search were conducted by a feisty
librarian? Ms. Dewey-the virtual host of a search engine run by
Microsoft between 2001 and 2006 as part of a marketing campaign-
presided over just such an arrangement.' Ms. Dewey stood directly
behind a simple and familiar search box and greeted users as they arrived
at the site. A fully rendered video image based on a professional actress,
Ms. Dewey would react differently depending on a user's search queries.
1. Msdewey.com is no longer a live website. Screenshots and other information
can be found at http://evb.com/work/ms-dewey-microsoft/.
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She displayed other human qualities such as impatience, tapping on the
screen with her finger if one waited too long to conduct a search.
Did Ms. Dewey implicate privacy? Like any search engine, Ms.
Dewey presumably collected a log of user search queries coupled with an
Internet protocol address, time-stamp, and other information. 2  MS.
Dewey may have also collected information on what results users
clicked. Microsoft probably stored this information for a period of time
and may have shared it with affiliates or law enforcement in accordance
with a written policy.3 Ms. Dewey may also have made it easier to find
out information about others; search engines organize and retrieve
information in a way that makes it easier to check up on neighbors, job
candidates, or first dates.
But Ms. Dewey had another, entirely distinct effect on users--one
that has practically nothing to do with the information Microsoft collects,
processes, or disseminates. She seemed like a person.
Study after study shows that humans are hardwired to react to
technological facsimiles like Ms. Dewey as though a person were
actually present.4 Human-like computer interfaces and machines evoke
powerful subconscious and physiological reactions, often identical to our
reactions to one another.' We of course understand intellectually the
difference between a person and a computer-generated image. But a
deep literature in communications and psychology evidences that we
"rarely make[] distinctions between speaking to a machine and speaking
to a person" at a visceral level.6
As a general matter, the more anthropomorphic qualities-
language, voice, face, eyes, and gestures-an interface possesses, the
greater our reaction.7 Ms. Dewey resembled a person in every sense, and
hence likely elicited a strong reaction across multiple lines. But such
reactions can occur with the slightest indication of intentionality: people
name and arrange play dates for their disk-shaped Roomba vacuum
2. For a recent discussion of the privacy problems associated with search engines,
see Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008 UTAH
L. REV. 1433 (2008).
3. See Microsoft Online Privacy Statement (last updated October 2009), available
at http://privacy.microsoft.comlen-us/fullnotice.mspx (last visited December 12, 2009).
4. See Part II.B (collecting studies).
5. See id.
6. CLIFFORD NASS & ScoTT BRAVE, WIRED FOR SPEECH: How VOICE ACTIVATES
AND ADVANCES THE HUMAN-COMPUTER RELATIONSHIP 4 (2005) [hereinafter "WIRED FOR
SPEECH"]; Leila Takayama & Clifford Nass, Driver Safety and Information from Afar: An
Experimental Driving Simulator Study of Wireless vs. In-Car Information Services, 66
INT. J. OF HUM.-COMP. STUD. 3, 173-84 ("These social responses to people and to
computers are automatic and largely unconscious.").
7. See infra Part II.
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cleaners, for instance, and take them on vacation.8 As some studies
recognize, such effects also explain our reactions to technologies that
merely stand in for a person, as in the case of a visible microphone or
camera. 9
Importantly, among the effects we experience in the presence of a
facsimile like Ms. Dewey is the feeling of being observed and
evaluated.'0  These effects can lead directly to measurable social
inhibitions. Research in communications and psychology has
demonstrated, among other things, that introducing a virtual person to a
computer interface causes test subjects to disclose less about themselves,
"present[] themselves in a more positive light," and even skip sensitive
questions on a questionnaire." The presence of eyes alone can lead us to
pay for coffee more often on the honor system,12 or be more charitable in
an exercise on giving.'3  These direct and measurable effects occur
irrespective of the subject's familiarity with technology, and even where
experimenters take pains to explain that no person will ever see the
results. 14
This means that advances in interface design-not just data
collection-should matter from the perspective of privacy. Existing and
emerging computer interface designs can exert a subtle chill on curiosity,
cause discomfort, and even change what people search for or say on the
Internet. As in the early days of the telegraph or telephone system,'5
communications transactions may once again be mediated by the
functional equivalent of a human operator.
Simulated people affect privacy in an even more basic sense. The
mere belief that another person is present triggers a state of
8. Robert Boyd, They're Gaining on us, But ... Even Advanced Robots Fall Short
ofHuman Intelligence, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 23, 2009, at 13.
9. See, e.g., Thomas J.L. van Rompay et al., The Eye of the Camera: Effects of
Security Cameras on Prosocial Behavior, 41 ENV'T & BEHAV. 1, 60-74 (2009)
[hereinafter "The Eye of the Camera"].
10. See infra Part II.B.2 (collecting studies).
11. Lee Sproull et al., When the Interface is a Face, 11 HUM.-COMPUTER
INTERACTION 97, 112-16 (1996) [hereinafter "When the Interface is a Face"].
12. Melissa Batson et al., Cues of Being Watched Enhance Cooperation in a Real-
World Setting, 2 BIOL. LETT. 412, 412-14 (2006).
13. See Vanessa Woods, Pay Up, You Are Being Watched, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 18,
2005, at 12 (reporting increase in the presence of a robot picture); Olivia Judson, Feel the
Eyes Upon You, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008, at WK12 (reporting increase with computer
screen eye spots).
14. BYRON REEVES & CLIFF NASS, THE MEDIA EQUATION: How PEOPLE TREAT
COMPUTERS, TELEVISION, AND NEW MEDIA LIKE REAL PEOPLE AND PLACES 252 (1996)
[hereinafter "THE MEDIA EQUATION"].
15. See JOSEPH WEIZENBAUM, COMPUTER, POWER, AND HUMAN REASON: FROM
CALCULATION TO JUDGEMENT 271 (1976).
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"psychological arousal" (and a host of associated behaviors), 6 such that
the introduction of voices and faces into historically private spaces could
further reduce opportunities for solitude and internality. We place
computers and machines into many places where we would not always
want humans-for instance, in our offices, cars, and homes. In doing so,
we may unwittingly invite the very social inhibitions that form the basis
of our decision to exclude others. We could secure fewer and fewer
"moments offstage," in Alan Westin's famous words, where we are free
to self-define without reference to others.' 7
Ms. Dewey was just a promotion-Microsoft's newest search
engine "Bing" does not have an attractive librarian that comments on
user searches.' 8  But Ms. Dewey is part of a far greater design trend
toward making interfaces more salient by imitating people. For a variety
of reasons, "[o]ne of the major trends in human-computer interaction. . .
is the development of more natural human-computer interfaces" that
present as people.' 9 Internet search engines are moving away from a
query-to-link interface and toward voice-driven, natural conversation.20
One example is the search engine Weegy, where users can ask questions
of a virtual woman with a voice and an animated face;2' another is the
iPhone application Siri, which answers spoken questions and performs
tasks like a personal assistant who fits in your pocket.22
Human voices and faces are indeed cropping up everywhere, in
computers, cars, phones, videos, even bedrooms.23 GPS devices and
16. See, e.g., Rompay, supra note 9, at 62. "Psychological arousal" refers to the
absence of relaxation and assurance which corresponds to the presence of others.
Sproull, supra note 11, at 112.
17. ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY & FREEDOM 35 (1967) ("There have to be moments 'off
stage' when the individual can be 'himself'; tender, angry, irritable, lustful, or dream
filled. ... To be always 'on' would destroy the human organism.").
18. See http://www.bing.com/ (last visited August 31, 2009).
19. T.M. Holtgraves et al., Perceiving Artificial Social Agents, 23 COMPUTERS IN
HUM. BEHAV. 2163 (2007).
20. See JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: How GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE
RULES OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE (2006); Rebecca Corliss, Interview
With John Battelle On The Future of Search, Hubpot.com (May 12, 2009),
http://blog.hubspot.com/blog/tabid/6307/bid/4750/lnterview-with-John-Battelle-on-the-
Future-of-Search.aspx (last visited December 12, 2009) ("Search is currently an interface
for working with machines. As we learn new ways to interact with information, it will
stop looking like a list of links and will start feeling more like a conversation.").
21. See www.weegy.com (last visited December 12, 2009).
22. See www.siri.com; John Markoff, A Software Secretary That Takes Charge,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at BU4.
23. See P.J. FOGG, PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGIES: USING COMPUTERS TO CHANGE
WHAT WE THINK AND Do 10 (2003) ("With the growth of embedded computers,
computing applications are becoming commonplace in locations where human persuaders
would not be welcome, such as bathrooms and bedrooms, or where humans cannot go
(inside clothing, embedded in automotive systems, or implanted in a toothbrush).").
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mobile phone apps have voices, opinions, and personalities. Websites,
including those run by the U.S. government, have virtual hosts;
companies have virtual receptionists. The computer giant IBM is testing
an entire voice-based Internet, which it refers to as "the Spoken Web."24
There is a corresponding trend in personal robotics-a global
industry growing at an incredible pace. Many investors-among them
Bill Gates-predict that personal robots will be as common in
25households as personal computers, perhaps within the next few years.
Engineers understand that as robots leave the factory floor, they will
have to fit in to various human-like roles and spaces, which in turn
means resembling people.26 Indeed, "each new generation of robots is
coming progressively closer to simulating human beings in appearance,
facial expression, and gesture." 2 7
The privacy community is not prepared for this sea change.
Technology has always been a key driver of privacy law, scholarship,
and policy.2 8  Yet our concerns reflect a particular understanding of
technology's impact on privacy: technology implicates privacy insofar as
it manipulates information. Technology is conceived as an instrument
that "provides new ways to do old things more easily, cheaply, and more
quickly than before."29  Where the "old thing" involves collecting,
processing, or disseminating information, the technology is thought to
implicate privacy.
Internet searches implicate privacy, as discussed, because a
company now holds a record of our curiosity or because it is easier to
find out information about someone. In this sense, today's call for new
thinking about privacy to accommodate technologies as diverse as search
engines,30 ubiquitous computing,3 or radio frequency identification
24. See John Rebeiro, IBM Testing Voice-Based Web, NETWORK WORLD, Sept. 11,
2009, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/091108-ibm-testing-voice-based.html.
25. See Bill Gates, A Robot In Every Home, Sci. AM. Jan. 2007, at 58.
26. See infra Part IIA.
27. Karl MacDorman & Hiroshi Ishiguro, The Uncanny Advantage of Using
Androids in Cognitive and Social Science Research, 7 INTERACTION STUD. 297, 298
(2006).
28. As Daniel Solove explains, "The development of new technologies kept concern
about privacy smoldering for centuries, but the profound proliferation of new information
technologies during the twentieth century .. . made privacy erupt into a frontline issue
around the world." DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 4 (2008).
29. Orin Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General
Approach, STAN. L. REv. (2009) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 7).
30. See, e.g., Tene, supra note 2, at 1433.
31. See, e.g., Scott Boone, Ubiquitous Computers, Virtual Worlds, and the
Displacement of Property Rights, 4 I/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 91, 93-94 (2008)
("Two legal issues presented by the advent of ubiquitous computing are readily apparent.
The first is the potential loss of privacy in continuously monitored environments that
constantly acquire, store and transmit information about individuals in those
814 [Vol. 114:3
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("RFID"),3 2 is little different from Samuel Warren's and Louis
Brandeis's 1890 call to expand tort law to accommodate the ease of
image collection occasioned by the recent invention of unposed or
"instantaneous" photography.33
This understanding no longer suffices. Technologies that introduce
the equivalent of people into our homes, cars, computers and mobile
devices-places historically experienced as private-threaten our
dwindling opportunities for solitude and self-development (the
importance of which privacy scholars of all sorts have long
maintained).34  In the commercial context, these features of interface
design may accordingly trigger consumer protection law. The overuse of
these techniques by the government may even implicate the First
Amendment's prohibition on excessive chilling effects.35
Our tendency to react to social technology as though it were
actually capable of observation and judgment also presents novel
opportunities to enhance privacy. Privacy scholars and advocates often
lament the invisibility of modem data collection. Privacy policies
meant to mitigate the problem of notice instead give users, who rarely
ever read them, a false sense of reassurance about how their data will be
environments. The second issue is the loss of Fourth Amendment protections that
naturally flow from a combination of the government and the initial loss of privacy.").
Ubiquitous computing refers to processors that are embedded into physical spaces and
networked together. Id. at 100-02.
32. See, e.g., Julie Maning Magid et al., RFID and Privacy Law: An Integrated
Approach, 46 AM. Bus. L.J. 1 (2009). Radio frequency identification refers to technology
capable of wireless transmission of identifying information. Id. at I n. 1.
33. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193,
195 (1890) (opening with a concern over "[r]ecent inventions and business methods"
such as "instantaneous photography").
34. Lior Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal
Information, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1667, 1736 (2008) ("Privacy theorists have long argued
that protecting privacy is essential so that individuals can relax, experiment with different
personalities to figure out who they truly are, or develop the insights that will make them
more productive citizens."). This is not to say that privacy and solitude are identical,
only that privacy provides an opportunity to be alone or among intimates, which in turn
permits relaxation and experimentation.
35. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) ("In recent years this Court has found
in a number of cases that constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or
'chilling,' effect of government regulations that fall short of direct prohibitions against
the exercise of First Amendment rights.").
36. Daniel Solove has likened contemporary society to a story out of Franz Kafka:
people vaguely realize others are collecting and using their information against them, but
lack a sense of what is being collected, when, by whom, or how specifically it is affecting
their daily experience. See Daniel Solove, Privacy & Power: Computer Databases and
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1393 (2001). See also DANIEL
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 6-9
(2004).
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used. 37 By placing an apparent person at the site of data collection, we
might use social interfaces to better calibrate a data subject's
expectations with the reality of how her information will be used and
shared.
This Article makes the case for a new dimension to the impact of
technology on privacy. It applies an extensive literature in
communications and psychology chronicling our reaction to
anthropomorphic designs to an equally rich literature describing the
function of privacy in society. In doing so, the Article informs both
disciplines by explicitly drawing a connection between the feeling of
being observed and the abrogation of privacy by technology. It seeks to
focus the privacy and technology debate exactly where it should be-on
any misalignment between user experience and actual information
practice.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the dominant view
of technology's impact on privacy. Technology is thought to implicate
privacy insofar as it makes it easier, cheaper, or faster to collect, process,
or disseminate information. Collection, processing, or dissemination
("CPD") scholarship proceeds largely by focusing in on one element-
collection, for instance-or else by cataloguing the harms caused by
greater efficiency and breadth in the manipulation of data.
Part II presents a novel dimension to technology's impact on
privacy. It discusses the growing trend toward designing interfaces and
machines to present like people. It then leverages an extensive literature
in communications and psychology evincing our hard-wired reaction to
such technology, which includes the sensation of being observed and
evaluated. Finally, Part II links up this literature with privacy
scholarship to demonstrate how anthropomorphic design implicates
traditional privacy values and may even present a novel opportunity to
enhance privacy.
Part III incorporates and applies the insights from Part II by
analyzing several existing technologies under a complete framework, and
then briefly sketches certain legal ramifications.
Securing privacy in the twenty-first century means more than
protecting against a future in which we never are alone by controlling the
flow of information. We must also account for a future in which we
never feel alone by recognizing the intended and unintended
consequences of how we design our interfaces and machines. Without
37. See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer King, What Californians Understand
About Privacy Online, SSRN Working Paper (Sept. 3, 2008), http://ssm.com/abstract-
1262130; Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Beyond Google & Evil, 14 FIRST MONDAY (Mar. 17,
2009), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fn/article/view/2326/2156.
38. See infra Part II.B.3.
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exploring this new frontier to technology's impact on privacy, we risk
silently losing the very societal benefits privacy aims to protect.
I. THE INSTRUMENTALIST CONCEPTION OF TECHNOLOGY
The year was 1976, and artificial intelligence pioneer Joseph
Weizenbaum was getting suspicious. Why was the Department of
Defense funding as many as four major labs to work on voice recognition
technology? "Granted that a speech-recognition machine is bound to be
enormously expensive, and that only government and possibly a few
very large corporations will therefore be able to afford it," he wondered,
"what will [they] be used for?" 39
When Weizenbaum asked the government, he was told that the
Navy wanted to be able to control ships by voice. 40  This struck
Weizenbaum as an odd answer. It occurred to him that the most natural
government use of voice recognition technology was massive
surveillance. "[T]here is no pressing human problem that will more
easily be solved because such machines exist. But such listening
machines, could they be made, will make monitoring of voice
communications very much easier than it is now."4 1
This insight, that an emerging technology can make some aspect of
surveillance "[v]ery much easier than it is now," is important and right,
but unfortunately it has come to dominate our thinking about the
intersection of technology and privacy. We tend to see technology in a
specific way, as an instrument to augment particular human capacities.
Technology makes it easier or faster to accomplish certain tasks. Where
these tasks include the power to collect, process, or disseminate
information, we see the potential for privacy harm.
That we think a certain way about technology is very important.
Technology is a-maybe the-key driver of privacy law. The standard
recital of evidence for this proposition includes Samuel Warren's and
Louis Brandeis's reference to the snap camera in formulating the four
privacy torts;42 the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in
39. WEIZENBAUM, supra note 15, at 272.
40. Id. at 271.
41. Id. at 272. Weizenbaum continues:
Perhaps the only reason that there is very little government surveillance in
many countries of the world is that such surveillance takes so much manpower.
Each conversation on a tapped phone must eventually be listened to by a
human agent. But speech-recognizing machines could delete all
"uninteresting" conversations and present transcriptions of only the remaining
ones.
Id.
42. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 33, at 195.
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response to wiretapping,4 3 dog sniffing,4 and infrared sensors; 45 the
promulgation of and multiple amendments to the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 198446 and Electronic Privacy Communications Act of
1986;47 to name but a few. The same is largely true of privacy
scholarship: developments in technology are thought to necessitate, or in
cases replace, regulation.4 8
For all its importance, however, our concept of the relationship
between technology and privacy is relatively limited. Technology
implicates privacy if it makes it easier or faster (or possible) to collect,
process, or disseminate information.
This instrumentalist, 49 information-focused view of the impact of
technology on privacy is pervasive. According to Erwin Chemerinsky,
"two developments are crucial" with respect to technology's impact on
privacy: "First there is unprecedented ability to learn the most intimate
and personal things about individuals. . . . Second, there is
unprecedented access to information."50  Orin Kerr observes that
"[t]echnology provides new ways to do old things more easily, cheaply,
and more quickly than before. As technology advances, legal rules
designed for one state of technology begin to have unintended
consequences." Ruth Gavison maintains that "[a]dvances in the
43. See, e.g. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (extending the Fourth
Amendment to cover the wiretapping of individuals in a telephone booth).
44. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
45. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2009). The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was modified in
1986, 1994, 1996, 2001, and again last year.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2009).
48. See, e.g., SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 28, at 4 ("[T]he
profound proliferation of new information technologies during the twentieth century ...
made privacy erupt into a frontline issue around the world."); id. (referring to Alan
Westin's "deep concern over the preservation of privacy under the new pressures of
surveillance technology"); JAMES WALDO ET AL., ENGAGING PRIVACY & INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY IN A DIGITAL AGE 2-3, 28, 88 (2007) [hereinafter "ENGAGING PRIVACY"]
(listing technology as one of three drivers of privacy change); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE
2.0 228-32 (2006) (arguing for a code-based approach to bolstering online privacy); Will
Thomas Devries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283,
285 (2003) ("The modern evolution of the privacy right is closely tied to the story of the
industrial-age technological development .... Unlike previous technological changes,
however, the scope and magnitude of the digital revolution is such that privacy law
cannot respond quickly enough to keep privacy relevant and robust."). See also infra
Part I.
49. For a discussion of the instrumentalist view of technology, see Maarten
Franssen, Gert-Jan Lokhorst, & Ibo van de Poel, Philosophy of Technology, THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed. 2009), available at
http://plato.stanford.edularchives/spr2009/entries/technology/.
50. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis' Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS
L.J. 643, 656 (2007).
51. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment, supra note 29, at *7.
818 [Vol. 114:3
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technology of surveillance and the recording, storage, and retrieval of
information have made it either impossible or extremely costly for
individuals to protect the same level of privacy that was once enjoyed."5 2
Summarizing the space, Michael Froomkin writes that "Privacy-
destroying technologies can be divided into two categories: those that
facilitate the acquisition of raw data and those that allow one to process
and collate that data in interesting ways."53 Jonathan Zittrain identifies
"three successive shifts in technology from the early 1970s: cheap
processors, cheap networks, and cheap sensors.... The third shift has,
with the help of the first two, opened the doors to new and formidable
privacy invasions."5 4
In 2007, the Committee of the National Research Council faced a
sweeping task: map all "potential areas of concern[,] privacy risks to
personal information associated with new technologies, [and] trends in
technology and practice that will influence impacts on privacy.",5 The
committee's many members, including privacy veterans Julie Cohen,
Helen Nissenbaum, and Gary Marx, describe holding differing
underlying conceptions of privacy.5 6 Nevertheless, the committee
"found common ground on several points among its members, witnesses,
and in the literature. The first point is that privacy touches a very broad
set of social concerns related to the control of, access to, and uses of
information."5 7  According to the report, such "[t]rends in information
technology have made it easier and cheaper by orders of magnitude to
52. Ruth Gavison, Privacy & The Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 465 (1980).
Gavison goes on to note, however, that "[t]echnology is not the whole story." Id. at 466.
53. Michael Froomkin, The Death ofPrivacy, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1468 (2000).
54. JONATHAN ZITERAIN, THE FuTuRE OF THE INTERNET: AND How TO STOP IT 205
(2007).
55. ENGAGING PRIVACY, supra note 48, at 20.
56. Id. at 84.
57. Id. The report discusses the implication of technology for privacy specifically
and at length. It identifies:
Several trends in technology [that] have led to concerns about privacy. One
such trend has to do with hardware that increases the amount of information
that can be gathered and stored and the speed with which the information can
be analyzed . . . . A second trend concerns the increasing connectedness of this
hardware over networks, which magnifies the increases in the capabilities of
the individual pieces . .. . A third trend has to do with advances in software
that allow sophisticated mechanisms for the extraction of information from the
data that are stored.
Id. at 88-89.
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gather, retain, and analyze information."58 These are just a few of many
examples. 59
Privacy and technology scholarship proceeds largely through a
process of divvying up the relevant territory. A scholar or set of scholars
might focus in on one mechanism-collection, for instance-and explain
its particular repercussions for privacy. When people had to pose for
photographs, privacy protections around personal images were largely
moot. Then "instantaneous" or "unposed" photography made it possible
to capture and publish unwanted circumstances, eventually necessitating
legal protection. It was once relatively harmless to make court records
public because an interested party had to show up at the courthouse or
archive. Today, better tools of dissemination like Internet search make
for routine perusal of such records.60
Again, there are many examples. Acknowledging that "much of the
best work on privacy . .. focuses on issues relating to the storage and
reuse of data," Froomkin deals largely with collection in his influential
article The Death ofPrivacy.61 Collection is first in a chain of events that
can lead to compromised privacy, Froomkin reasons. Accordingly, "the
most effective way of controlling information about oneself is not to
share it." 62 Froomkin is concerned that life will become completely open
and permeable, particularly to industry and government.63
58. Id. at 30. See also id. at 51 ("Technology can be used to enhance human sense
and cognitive capabilities, and these capabilities can affect the ability to collect
information . . . ."); id. at vii (noting that there exist "unbounded options for collecting,
saving, sharing, and comparing information").
59. See, e.g., SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 28, at 189 (noting that
often "technology is involved in various privacy problems because it facilitates the
gathering, processing, and dissemination of information"); Andrew McClurg, A
Thousand Words are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer Data
Profiling, 98 Nw. U.L. REv. 63 (2003); Paul Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal
Data, 117 HARv. L. REv. 2055 (2004) ("Modem computing technologies and the Internet
have generated the capacity to gather, manipulate, and share massive quantities of
data."); Gary Marx, Seeing Hazily (But Not Darkly) Through the Lens, 30 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 339, 392 (2005) ("In addition to the legislative and cultural changes that
followed 9/11, means of data collection, storage, analysis, and communication continue
to increase in sophistication, power, scale, speed . . . . They also continue to decline in
cost."); Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 283, 291 (2003) (paraphrasing others that the major developments that "deeply affect
privacy ... all concern changes wrought by digital technology on the ability to
manipulate information").
60. Harry Surden worries, for instance, that search and other technologies of
dissemination break down the "structural" protections that privacy enjoys, such as the
fact that court records have historically been difficult to access. See Harry Surden,
Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REv. 1605 (2007).
61. Froomkin, supra note 53, at 1463.
62. Id. at 1463.
63. Id. at 1465.
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Much of Ian Kerr's work speaks to new technologies that gather
information. Kerr has specifically written about the use of software
"bots," i.e., low-level artificial intelligence used to gain user trust, but
only in order to point out that such techniques allow for the collection of
sensitive information on a mass scale."' More recent work focuses on the
concept of "emanations," essentially a novel way to look at collection.65
Privacy scholar and criminologist Gary Marx's recent work What's
New About the New Surveillance is broad in scope.6 6 Yet Marx too
describes the "new" (i.e., contemporary) surveillance largely in terms of
its ability to penetrate old barriers to observation:
New technologies for collecting personal information which
transcend the physical, liberty enhancing limitations of the old means
are constantly appearing. These probe more deeply, widely and
softly than traditional methods, transcending natural (distance,
darkness, skin, time and microscopic size) and constructed (walls,
sealed envelopes) barriers that historically protected personal
information. 67
Another set of scholars rejects the primacy of collection and focuses
instead on processing or retention. According to Tal Zarsky, "mere
surveillance . . . is not grounds for concern, at least not on its own. The
fact that there [is] an eye watching and an ear listening is meaningless
unless the collected information is recorded and emphasized."68 Zarsky
locates the greatest threat posed by technology to privacy in increasingly
sophisticated capacity for data mining.69 He is concerned by "complex
algorithms, artificial intelligence, neural networks and even genetic-
based modeling" capable of drawing incredible and accurate inferences.70
Such techniques can turn seemingly harmless data into useful
64. Ian Kerr, Bots, Babes, and the Californication of Commerce, I U. OTTAWA L. &
TECH. J. 285 (2004).
65. Ian Kerr, Emanations, Snoop Dogs and Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 52
CRIM. L. Q. 392 (2007).
66. Gary Marx, What's New About the New Surveillance, 1 SURVEILLANCE & SOC'Y
9 (2005). Marx discusses several aspects of contemporary surveillance, including its lack
of visibility, its continuousness, its difficulty to avoid, and its lower expense. Id.
67. Id. at 9.
68. Tal Zarsky, Mine Your Own Business!: Making the Case for the Implications of
the Data Mining ofPersonal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J. L. &
TECH. 1, 4 (2006) (emphasis in original).
69. Id. "Data mining is correctly defined as the 'nontrivial process of identifying
valid, novel, potentially useful and ultimately understandable patterns in data."' Id. at 5.
70. Id. at 6.
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intelligence, or take an old database and "discover previously unknown
facts and phenomenon."
Still others insist that the full scope of the problem arises only when
we see the totality of surveillance capacity, the combined impact of an
increased ability to collect and process and disseminate information.72
Richard Clarke coined the term "dataveillance" to describe the
systematic observation, collation, and dissemination that modem
computing make possible. According to Julie Cohen:
[T]hreats to privacy from visual surveillance become most acute
when visual surveillance and database surveillance are integrated,
enabling both real-time identification of visual surveillance subjects
and subsequent searches of stored visual and database surveillance
records. 73
Solove, Cohen, Marx, Paul Schwartz, and others develop
sophisticated theoretical models that engage with the impact of existing
and emerging technologies on privacy, identity, and autonomy.74 These
accounts identify and complicate the effects of private and public
surveillance on the individual or society. For instance, Solove writes
about the ability of private and public entities to aggregate data and
assemble or share "digital dossiers," and the deep societal repercussions
of this capacity.
It is hard to overestimate the importance, interest, and variety of
such effects-focused accounts. They have deepened our understanding
of the techniques and outcomes of surveillance, potential and actual, for
society. Yet these accounts generally proceed from the same starting
assumptions about what technologies implicate privacy in the first place
71. Id. at 8. See also Ira Rubenstein, Ronald Lee, & Paul Schwartz, Data Mining
and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory & Technical Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L.
REv. 261 (2008) (discussing data mining capabilities).
72. See Julie Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey
Rosen, 89 GEO. L.J. 2029, 2037 (2001) ("More recent commentators have argued that the
threat lies not merely in the ease of access to digitized data, but also in the new and more
complex permutations and profiles that interlinked digital databases enable.").
73. Julie Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, & Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
181, 183-84 (2008).
74. See, e.g., SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 36; Paul Schwartz, Privacy
and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1609, 1640-41 (1999); Paul Schwartz,
Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815 (2000); Julie Cohen, Examined
Lives: Information Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1373 (2000);
Julie Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007).
75. Daniel Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of the Fourth Amendment,
75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1083 (2002).
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and thereby create a problematic state of surveillance-namely,
technologies that manipulate data.76
A significant minority of commentators plug into the discussion
through an exclusive focus on the third element, disclosure of data to
others. These writers deny any privacy harm-or, in the Fourth
Amendment context, constitutional implication-unless and until the
information gets disclosed to, or is accessed by, a human being. Thus,
Richard Parker maintains that "generally, the collection of data by
government and other institutions, as described by [Alan] Westin and
[Arthur] Miller, is not a loss of privacy per se, but rather a threat to one's
privacy."" Eric Goldman "question[s] how data mining, without more,
creates consequential harm." 7 8
This notion features specially in the context of national security.
Thought-leaders argue that scanning communications and financial
records for evidence of terrorist activity-a.k.a. government data
mining-does not invade privacy to the extent it is automated. If
anything, such collection and processing by a computer protects privacy
because no human need ever see the data.79
Orin Kerr argues for an "exposure-based approach" to interpreting
Fourth Amendment searches of digital files.80 He subdivides computer
76. See, e.g., DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 17 (2007) ("We will be
forced to live with a detailed record beginning with childhood that will stay with us for
life wherever we go, searchable and accessible from anywhere in the world."); Schwartz,
Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, supra note 74, at 1640-41 ("This Article has
described a privacy horror show-the widespread collection and disclosure of detailed
personal data on the Internet.").
77. Richard Parker, A Definition ofPrivacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 285 (1974).
78. Eric Goldman, Data Mining and Attention Consumption, in PRIVACY AND
TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 225, 226 (Katherine
J. Strandburg & Daniela Raicu eds., 2005). Regarding a hypothetical list of male Latino
AIDS patients generated by a computer but "not displayed to a human" (instead,
"immediately discarded"), Goldman observes, "Indeed, no adverse consequence of any
sort occurs because the world is the same whether the list is generated or not. The data
subject does not experience any change, internally (the data subject never knows that the
list was generated) or externally (no one else knows either)." Id. at 228 (emphasis
added).
79. As Richard Posner writes in a popular op ed:
The collection, mainly through electronic means, of vast amounts of personal
information is said to invade privacy. But machine collection and processing
of data cannot, as such, invade privacy. Because of their volume, the data are
first sifted by computers, which search for names, addresses, phone numbers,
etc., that may have intelligence value. This initial shifting, far from invading
privacy (a computer is not a sentient being), keeps most private data from being
read by any intelligence officer.
Richard Posner, Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at A31
(emphasis added).
80. Orin Kerr, Searchers and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REv. 531,
551 (2005).
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forensics into two steps: "the data acquisition phase and the data
reduction phase."' On Kerr's view, "a search occurs when information
from or about the data is exposed to human observation." 8 2 Acquiring
the information does not trigger a search, nor is the constitutional test
implicated where information is merely "processed by a computer.,8 3
Lawrence Lessig also advances the view, albeit with little sympathy, that
a government worm that "searches perfectly and invisibly, discovering
only the guilty" might fail to trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 84
In sum, the notion that technology implicates privacy insofar as it
augments the power to collect, process, or disseminate information
dominates privacy and technology commentary.
The result is that certain assumptions and biases pervade the
scholarship. First, technology must manipulate information to get on the
privacy community's radar. Second, the initial focus is on the watcher
and her new powers, rather than on the subject of observation and his
new detriment. Even where the discussion centers on the complex
repercussions of living in a technology-mediated world, these effects are
assumed to result from the increased power of observation along
established lines.
Scholars-Cohen and Arthur Miller, among others-have noted that
generalized surveillance can implicate privacy even in the absence of the
collection of information in a specific instance. It is probably enough
simply not to know whether you are being watched to experience
81. Id. at 547.
82. Id. at 551.
83. Id.
84. LESSIG, supra note 48, at 20-23. Courts also tend to view the impact of
technology in terms of what it allows a human operator to see or do. See, e.g., United
States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that the use of a dog is
"not a mere improvement of their sense of smell, as ordinary eyeglasses improve vision,
but is a significant enhancement accomplished by a different, and far superior, sensory
instrument"). See also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27 (2001); Christopher Slobogin, Technologically Assisted Physical
Surveillance: The American Bar Associations Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 383, 395 (1997) (noting that certain courts have "distinguished between devices
that 'improve' human senses and devices that 'replace' them, with the latter being more
likely to implicate the Fourth Amendment"). The views espoused by Posner, Kerr, and
others have also been contested. See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, Searches and Seizures in a
Networked World, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 83 (2005).
85. Cf Cohen, supra note 73, at 191 ("Even localized, uncoordinated surveillance
may be experienced as intrusive in ways that have nothing to do with whether data trails
are captured."); Gavison, supra note 52, at 432 ("[A]ttention alone will cause a loss of
privacy even if no new information becomes known."); Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of
Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 554 (2006) ("While many forms of intrusion are
motivated by a desire to gather information or result in the revelation of information,
intrusion can cause harm even if no information is involved.").
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discomfort or chilling effects;86 this is of course the exact mechanism
behind Jeremy Bentham's much-discussed design for prisons and other
facilities.87
Yet the insight that no information need be collected in order for
technology to implicate privacy is under-discussed and under-theorized.
Privacy harm without collection is seen as a byproduct of a larger
surveillance context. The notion that technology and design is evolving
in a way that implicates privacy directly by manipulating experience
instead of information is rarely discussed at all. The result is that
existing and emerging technologies never make it on the privacy radar.
We turn for this evidence to the next Part.
II. A NEW FRONTIER IN PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY SCHOLARSHIP
Privacy scholarship of the last century has proven very effective at
tracking developments in technology that implicate privacy by
manipulating information-that make it easier to collect, process, or
disseminate data. Of course, technology evolves in more ways than one.
Changes to the architecture and capabilities of everyday devices have
been accompanied by equally rapid advances in appearance and user
interface design. These design changes may be as or more significant in
the ways we experience the world, including with respect to our privacy.
Across a variety of disciplines, sectors, and media, interfaces and
machines are becoming more and more human-like in appearance and
interaction. Our newest gadgets have faces, voices, or both, and many
are capable of understanding a range of natural language commands or
inquiries. "People now routinely use voice-input and voice-output
systems," observes communications scholar Clifford Nass, "to check
airline reservations, order stocks, control cars, navigate the Web, dictate
memos into a word processor, entertain children, and perform a host of
other tasks."88 The computers in our cars "are moving from just control
under the hood to actively interacting with the driver."89 The computers
86. As a small example: customers purchasing certain "awkward" products such as
condoms experienced measurably higher levels of discomfort in experiments when a
dummy camera was trained on the register. See The Eye of the Camera, supra note 9, at
69. The camera serves as a reminder of the possibility of surveillance whether or not it
was recording, which is sufficient to change individual experience. Id.
87. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS (1995). For a seminal
discussion of Bentham's Panopticon and its impact on society, see MICHEL FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200 (1979).
88. WIRED FOR SPEECH, supra note 6, at 3.
89. Takayama & Nass, supra note 6 at 173.
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on our desktops and phones increasingly present us with "digital
communicators" that "autonomously interact with users." 90
The phenomenon is also evident in the emerging field of personal
robotics-predicted to be a multi-billion dollar industry within five
years.9' Robots developed for home or office use resemble us more and
more. "[E]ach new generation of robots is coming progressively closer
to simulating human beings in appearance, facial expression, and
gesture."92 Meanwhile, "the role of assistive agents in the home is
becoming more and more important. 93 Robots are falling in price and
will soon be widely available outside of standard markets (such as Japan
and South Korea).
The upshot of this trend, or set of trends, is that artificial social
agents are being introduced into a variety of new contexts--computers,
mobile devices, cars, offices, and houses. Psychologists and
communications experts will tell you that the effect of this technology on
people is unconscious but pronounced, and to an extent unavoidable.94
We are hardwired to react to these agents as though they were actually
human, including with respect to the feeling of being observed and
evaluated.95 Privacy scholars, in turn, will tell you that a key role of
privacy is to protect a certain measure of solitude and freedom from
scrutiny, the absence of which will thwart self-development and
encourage conformism.96
This Part proceeds as follows. Section A discusses a strong and
well-documented trend, that of designing machines and interfaces that
present as people. Section B draws from a rich literature around
90. Li Gong & Clifford Nass, When a Talk-Face Computer is Half-Human and Half-
Humanoid: Human Identity and Consistency Preference, 33 HUM. COMM. RES. 163, 163
(2007).
91. Nicole Fabris, Personal Robots Are Here (and by 2015 They'll Be Worth $15
Billion), ABI Research (Dec. 2007) available at http://www.nextgenresearch.com/
research/1001344-PersonalRobotics.
92. Karl MacDorman & Hiroshi Ishiguro, The Uncanny Advantage of Using
Androids in Cognitive and Social Science Research, 7 INTERACTION STUD. 297, 298
(2006).
93. Siddhartha Srinivasa et al., HERB: A Home Exploring Robotic Butler, Intel
Working Paper (2009), *1 available at http://personalrobotics.intel-research.net/projects/
HERBO9.pdf [hereinafter "HERB"].
94. See Takayama & Nass supra note 6 at 174 ("These social responses to people
and to computers are automatic and largely unconscious.") The extent of the effect of
social technology is not uncontroverted. See, e.g., BENJAMIN SHNEIDERMAN, DESIGNING
THE USER INTERFACE: STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE HUMAN COMPUTER INTERACTION (3d
1998) (arguing inter alia that anthropomorphized interfaces do not generally succeed and
often lead to confusion). There appears to be general agreement, however, that
anthropomorphic design elicits reactions in controlled conditions.
95. See infra Part II.B.2.
96. See infra Part II.C.
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communications and psychology demonstrating that people react to such
social entities or reminders as though they were truly human, including
with respect to the feeling of being observed. Section C argues that
anthropomorphic design accordingly creates two kinds of privacy harms.
Introducing apparent agents into the few remaining spaces normally
reserved for alone time further threatens solitude, creating a state of
constant psychological arousal that many scholars have warned exactly
against. Users will no longer be surfing or searching the Internet alone,
as it were, with the likely consequence that attitudes and behavior will
shift toward the conventional. The final section discusses potential
privacy-enhancing uses of anthropomorphic design.
A. The Rise of the Social Interface
A long-term but recently accelerated goal of computer interface
designers is to leverage language, voice, and other features of human
communication in an effort to make better interfaces. There are several
reasons for this trend. People find experiences with social interfaces
more engaging, upping human cooperation and making the devices
"easier and more comfortable to use."9 7  Moreover, voice-activated
interfaces allow for hands-free interaction, an increasingly relevant
feature as computing follows people wherever they are (for instance, into
a car).98
It is also getting easier to build good social interfaces. "Advances
in artificial intelligence are putting new life into the development of
highly interactive and human-like computer-mediated characters or
agents. These advances in technology have allowed computer interfaces
to become more social and interactive." 99 Although they have been
"fairly clunky for a long time," observe human-computer interaction
(HCI) researchers, "[d]esigners can aspire to ever more responsive
interfaces." 00
To an even greater extent than in HCI, human-robot interaction is
trending toward more social and natural interactions. It is fair to say,
along with Victoria Groom, that "the very nature of robots make them
appear even more like social entities than most other existing
technologies."' Each new generation of personal robot is more
97. Sproull, supra note 11, at 98; see also infra II.B.1.
98. WIRED FOR SPEECH, supra note 6, at 3.
99. Jong-Eun Roselyn Lee et al., The Case for Caring Colearners: The Effects of a
Computer-Mediated Colearner Agent on Trust and Learning, 57 J. OF COMM. 183, 184
(2007).
100. Sproull, supra note 11, at 118.
101. Victoria Groom, What's the Best Role for a Robot? Cybernetic Models of
Existing and Proposed Human-Robot Interaction Structures, ICINCO 2008, 325,
2010]1 827
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
humanlike than the one before.10 2 Today's robots "come equipped with
the very abilities that humans have evolved to ease our interactions with
one another: eye contact, gaze direction, tum-taking, shared
attention." 03
There are again several reasons behind this trend. One is the widely
held belief among roboticists that true intelligence requires a degree of
physicality or "embodiment." 04  According to this concept, "to build
systems that have human-level intelligence [one must] build robots that
have not merely a physical body but in fact a humanoid form." 05  A
related position holds that robots will "learn" faster by interacting with
people than through rote programming. Cynthia Breazeal, the head of
MIT's influential Media Lab, has said of her doctoral project "Kismet," a
robot with large, expressive eyes, big floppy ears, and a speaker to make
cooing noises: "I hoped that if I built an expressive robot that responded
to people, they might treat it in similar way to babies, and the robot
would learn from that." 06  Breazeal's impressive work continues to
advance in this direction. 07
It is also thought that robots must also be "human enough" to
accomplish certain tasks or fill certain roles. Roboticists from Carnegie
Mellon, for instance, developed a "nursebot" named Pearl for use in
hospitals and facilities for the elderly. They found that patients would
not respond to Pearl until they made "her" sufficiently human-like; "if
the Nursebot is too machine-like, her human clients ignore her, and
available at http://chime.stanford.edu/downloads/groom-robot-role_ICINCO-2008.pdf
(last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
102. See MacDorman & Ishiguro, supra note 27, at 298.
103. Robin Marantz Henig, The Real Transformers, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 29, 2007,
at 28.
104. H.R. EKBIA, ARTIFICIAL DREAMS 259 (2008). Embodiment refers to placing
artificial intelligence in a physical machine capable of sensing and acting upon the
outside world. Id.
105. Id.
106. PAMELA MCCORDUCK, MACHINES WHO THINK 464 (2004).
107. See, e.g., Cynthia Breazeal et al., An Embodied Cognition Approach to
Mindreading Skills for Socially Intelligent Robots, 28 INT'L J. OF ROBOTICS RES., 656
(2009). Under the direction of Breazeal, MIT's influential Media Lab has been moving
toward ever more lifelike robots. Breazeal pioneers the field of "social robotics" and has
helped create a class of "Mobile/Dextrous/Social" robots capable of mimicking emotion
and responding to social cues. The Media Lab's newest project, Leonardo, is a
collaboration between MIT roboticists and Hollywood animatronics experts at Stan
Winston Studio. Leonardo, or "Leo" for short, has a wide range of facial expressions,
can gesture naturally, and is responsive to human cues; Leo will, for instance, follow a
person's gaze toward a particular object or direction. For more on the MIT media lab,
visit http://www.media.mit.edu/.
828 [Vol. 114:3
PEOPLE CAN BE So FAKE
won't exercise or take their pills."108  Generally speaking, the more
human-like a robot appears, the more we like and respond to it.109
As a recent New York Times article summarizes:
The push for social robotics comes from two directions. One is
pragmatic: if... the robots are coming, they should be designed in
such a way that makes them fit most naturally into the lives of
ordinary people. The other is more theoretical: if a robot can be
designed to learn in the same way natural creatures do, this could be a
significant boost for the field of artificial intelligence.110
At any rate, the result is clear: computers and machines that present
like people are rapidly become the norm. The absence of such an
interface may one day mark the exception. Social agents are cropping up
in a wide variety of spaces--computers, cars, mobile devices, even our
homes. What follows are some examples of the devices that have
already been designed and deployed.
1. Computer Interfaces, Generally
Americans spend at lot of time at the computer,"' where they are
encountering a slew of virtual agents. "Computer-generated characters
are increasingly used as digital communicators on Web sites and in
computer applications and games."ll 2  There are many examples:
Microsoft's famously annoying paper clip assistant pops up by default to
guide new users of Microsoft Word. An anthropomorphic dog assists
computer searches in Microsoft's dominant operating system. A virtual
trainer on the popular Wii gaming system encourages exercisers and is
108. See MCCORDUCK,supra note 106, at 467. Conversely, researchers worried that
by making Nursebot too humanlike, patients might form unnatural attachments to it. Id.
109. Henig, supra note 103, at 10; see also Tim Hornyak, Android Science, Sci. AM.,
May 2006, at 32 ("'Appearance is very important to have better interpersonal
relationships with a robot,' says the 42-year-old Ishiguro. 'Robots are information
media, especially humanoid robots. Their main role in our future is to interact naturally
with people."'). There is a limit to this principle sometimes referred to as the "uncanny
valley." Many find a robot that looks quite a lot, but not exactly, like a person quite
disconcerting. See MacDorman & Ishiguro, supra note 27, at 299-302 (describing the
"uncanny valley").
110. Henig, supra note 103, at 3; see also Selma Sabanovic et al., Robotics in the
Wild: Observing Human-Robot Social Interaction Outside the Lab, 2006 IIEE ("Social
robotics projects vary greatly in their stated scientific, technical, and social goals. Some
researchers . . . seek to improve the quality of human-machine interaction by creating
interfaces that will rely on social cues and therefore be more natural, intuitive and
familiar for users.").
111. U.S. Census Bureau, Computer and Internet Use in the United States, Current
Population Reports, Oct. 2005.
112. Gong & Nass supra note 90, at 163.
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able through the Wii controller to detect and react when users are
flagging." 3
The company Active Buddy Inc. creates sophisticated, text-based
virtual marketers that operate via instant messenger.1 14 ELLEgirlBuddy,
developed to promote Elle Girl magazine and its advertisers, interacted
with thousands of teens across the Internet before it was eventually
retired.' 15 Although it had no body, the bot claimed to have body image
problems.' It was newly developed but claimed to be sixteen.117 It said
it had a "major crush" on its kickboxing instructor." 8 Bots participate
regularly on massive multiplayer online games and even Twitter, a text-
based social network that is growing exponentially. Such text-based bots
are getting so good at faking people that in a recent Turing Award
competition," 9 a German program called Elbot fooled twenty-five
percent of judges into believing it was a person. 12 0
The U.S. government has even entered this space. SGT Star is the
U.S. Army's virtual recruiter who resides on the website
www.GoArmy.com.121 SGT Star appears as an avatar, speaking out loud
in addition to displaying text. He addresses prospective recruits by name
(having asked for it). He can be both funny and agitated, as when in
response to a command to do push ups he raises his voice to yell, "Hey,
I'm the sergeant here. YOU drop down and give me twenty. I can't hear
you!" He can also take a compliment; if you tell SGT Star that you like
him he responds "Thanks. I try." 2 2
A recent call for research regarding artificial agents by the
Department of Advanced Research Projects (DARPA) goes much
further, seeking "a highly interactive PC or web-based application to
allow family members to verbally interact with 'virtual' renditions of
113. See Wii Fit Website, http://www.nintendo.com/wiifit (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
114. See Gwendolyn Mariano, Active Buddy Lets Companies Control Bots, CNET,
Feb. 6, 2002, http://news.cnet.com/ActiveBuddy-lets-companies-control-bots/2100-
1023 3-830620.html.
115. I owe this example to Ian Kerr, who uses it in the context of surreptitious data
collection. See Kerr, supra note 64, at 313-16.
116. Id. at 313.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. The reference is to Alan Turing, the artificial intelligence pioneer that
established a test for intelligence based on the computer's ability to appear
indistinguishable from a person. See EKBIA, supra note 104, at 18.
120. Melissa Lafsky, How Can You Tell If Your IM Buddy Is Really A Machine?,
DISCOVER (Mar. 23, 2009), available at http://discovermagazine.com/2009/mar/25-how-
can-you-tell-if-your-im-buddy-is-really-a-machine.
121. To chat with Sergeant Star, visit http://www.goarmy.com/ChatWithStar.do.
122. See id.
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deployed Service Members."l 23  The call for research banks on the
inability of children to distinguish between a video rendition of their
parent and the actual parent. It continues:
The challenge is to design an application that would allow a child to
receive comfort from being able to have simple, virtual conversations
with a parent who is not available "in-person." . . . The child should
be able to have a simulated conversation with a parent about generic,
everyday topics. For instance, a child may get a response [from the
virtual parent] from saying "I love you," or "I miss you," or "Good
night mommy/daddy." 24
2. Internet Search in Particular
Search is the gateway to many Internet users' experiences; it too is
trending toward the anthropomorphic. Today, search proceeds through a
relatively simple process, at least from the perspective of the user: one
enters relevant words into a text field and gets back a series of links on a
results page. This is very likely to change. According to Marissa Mayer,
vice president for search of the dominant search titan Google, "search is
in its infancy."l 2 5
Both of the major ways in which search will change over the next
few years implicate anthropomorphic design. First, searches will
increasingly occur by voice instead of text. Second, search inquiries and
results will increasingly take the form of a natural conversation between
the user and the interface, rather than a query-to-links transaction.
In a recent interview, Google's Mayer noted that one of the more
interesting directions of search will be a shift toward asking questions
out loud.126  Writing on the subject of Google's voice-driven search
application, New York Times writer John Markoff observes: "The ability
to recognize just about any phrase from any person has long been the
supreme goal of artificial intelligence researches looking for ways to
make man-machine interactions more natural." 27
123. Department of Defense, SBIR/STIR Interactive Topic Information System
(SITIS), Virtual Dialogue Application for Families of Deployed Service Members, Topic
Number OSDO9-HO3 (OSD), http://www.dodsbir.net/Sitis/archives-display-topic.asp?
Bookmark=34653 (last visited Dec. 3, 2009).
124. Id.
125. Interview by Michael Arrington with Marissa Mayer, Vice President of Search




127. John Markoff, Google Is Taking Your Questions (Spoken, via the iPhone), N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008, at Bl.
2010] 831
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Relatedly, search will move from a transaction between text queries
and link results, to a conversation between user and software. Weegy is
a website where users ask a question of a fully animated human face and
receive the answer spoken out loud.128  The new Wolfram Alpha
"answer" engine is more standard in its interface but also takes a natural
language interface approach to search.12 9 Rather than process key words
and chum out a list of results, Wolfram takes sentence-long questions
and presents answers in a table. According to its creator, Wolfram is
"like interacting with an expert"; the engine "will understand what you
are talking about, do the computation and present to you results."1 30
Statements by Google principals indicate that the company is also
moving in this direction, toward what is "obviously artificial
intelligence" in the sense that it searches and answers with something
like a human understanding.13 1
As John Battelle, the author of The Search, has said, we will soon
look to Internet search like a personal expert.1 3 2  Researchers and
designers ultimately imagine a world in which "users will not simply talk
at and listen to computers, nor will computers simply talk at or listen to
users. Instead, people and computers will cooperatively speak with one
another."l 33
3. Mobile and In-Car Devices
We carry increasingly complex devices outside of the home as
well-from in-car navigation systems to "smart" mobile phones. A
survey of experts conducted by the Pew Internet and American Life
Project predicted that the mobile device will become our primary means
to connect to the Internet within eleven years. 13 4 To an even greater
extent than personal computers, mobile devices leverage voice and
natural conversation in an effort to assist "hands free" interactivity.
Again, a common function is mobile Internet search. Users of Google's
new mobile application "can place the phone to their ear and ask
128. Weegy can be found at http://www.weegy.com.
129. Wolfram Alpha can be found at http://www.wolframalpha.com/.
130. Larry Dignan, Wolfram/Alpha Demo: Search Results Meet Analytics, ZDNET,
Apr. 28, 2009, http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/?p= 17129.
131. See, e.g., Interview by Academy of Achievement with Larry Page, Founding
CEO, Google Inc., in London, Eng. (Oct. 28, 2000), http://www.achievement.org/
autodoc/page/pag0int-3.
132. See Interview with John Battelle, supra note 20.
133. WIRED FOR SPEECH, supra note 6, at 184.
134. Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, The Future of the Internet III, PEW INTERNET &
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT,(Dec. 14, 2008), http://www.pewintemet.org/Reports/2008/The-
Future-of-the-Intemet-III.aspx.
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virtually any question, like 'Where's the nearest Starbucks?' or 'How tall
is Mount Everest?"" 35
Another popular function is hands free feature control. Providers
such as Vlingo offer voice interfaces to control most aspects of a phone,
including data retrieval.13 6  Yet another is notification or motivation.
Japanese businessmen can purchase "virtual wives," for instance, that
appear on their phones and, according to (somewhat objectionable)
descriptions on the product, "nag" them to eat healthier.'37 There is a
phone application with an avatar that encourages users to do pushups, in
part by yelling at them.138
Some combine multiple functions: Siri is a mobile application
developed using artificial intelligence from DARPA.139  "Like a real
assistant, Siri helps you get things done. You interact with Siri by just
saying, in your own words, what you want to do."140 Siri can help you
search for and purchase movie tickets, for instance, and share
information with friends, all through voice command.
Particularly in the West, individuals spend a significant portion of
their time in cars.141 One report puts average American car time at over
500 hours per year.142 And, of course, car devices were among the first
to imitate people. GPS devices have long relied on voice output, a
powerful anthropomorphic force. Many cars have built in navigation
devices with programmable personalities and voices. Today's-and
certainly tomorrow's-vehicles are "actively interacting with the
driver," 4 3 such that drivers have something the brain thinks of as a
companion. MIT recently announced plans to build a robotic driving
companion.14 4
135. Markoff, supra note 127, at Bl.
136. For more on Vlingo, go to http://www.vlingo.com.
137. This product can be found at http://www.metaboinfo.com/okusamal (in
Japanese).
138. See Mike Butcher, PushUpFu Turns iPhone into Fitness Gaming Network,
TECHCRUNCH EUROPE (Jan. 2, 2009), http://uk.techcrunch.com/2009/01/02/pushupfu-
turns-iphone-into-fitness-gaming-network/.
139. About Siri, http://www.siri.com/company (last visited Dec. 3, 2009). For press
coverage of Sii, see http://www.siri.com/news.
140. About Siri, http://www.siri.com/company (last visited Dec. 3, 2009).
141. Stephen Phillips, The Dashboard Will Become a Voice-Activated Computer: In-
Car Computing Platforms, FIN. TIMEs, June 6, 2001, at 8.
142. Id.
143. Takayama & Nass, supra note 6, at 1.
144. Clay Dillow, MIT Introduces a Friendly Robot Companion for Your Dashboard,
PopSci, Oct. 29, 2009, available at http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2009-
10/fiendly-robot-companion-your-dashboard (last visited Nov. 6, 2009).
2010] 833
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
4. Robots in the Home
Whether in five years or fifteen, the field of personal robotics is
poised to explode.145 Microsoft founder Bill Gates claims that robotics
today is at the point personal computing was in the 1970s and guesses
that personal robots will one day be as popular and widespread as PCs.14 6
According to Gates, "they could have just as profound an impact on the
way we work, communicate, learn, and entertain ourselves as the PC has
had over the past 30 years." 4 7
The numbers are beginning to bear out Gates's prediction. Robots
are getting cheaper-having dropped 80% in cost since 1990-and
global demand for robots is rising.14 8 Business consultant ABA Research
predicts that personal robotics will be a 15 billion dollar market by 2015,
a number supported by UN commissioned statistics. 14 9 The government
of South Korea, for instance, has announced a goal of one robot per
household by 2013.150
As noted robot expert and University of Sheffield professor Neil
Sharkey explains:
We are at the crossroads of a brave new world of robots with the
density of robots on the planet picking up year upon year at an
increasing rate. The UN robotics survey at the end of 2006 estimated
a worldwide operational stock of over 3.8 million. A big surprise is
that 2.9 million of the robots are for servicing [] personal and private
needs. More than a million of these were for leisure and personal
entertainment. This is a big change.' 5
145. "Personal" or "service" robotics refers to robots that co-exist with people outside
of an industrial context such as a car manufacturing plant. Purposes include customer
and personal service, entertainment, and security. MCCORDUCK, supra note 106, at 467.
146. Gates, supra note 25, at 62.
147. Id. at 65; see also MCCORDUCK, supra note 106, at 467 (noting a rise in personal
and service robotics); Noel Sharkey, 2084: Big Robot Is Watching You: Report on the
Future of Robots for Policing, Surveillance, and Security, Working Paper, available at
http://www.dcs.shef.ac.uk/%7Enoel/Future%20robot%20policing%20report%20Final.do
c [hereinafter Big Robot].
148. Big Robot, supra note 147, at 3.
149. See Fabris, supra note 91; Gundren Litzenberger, The Robots Are Coming!, IFR
Statistical Dep't, Press Release, Oct. 23, 2007 (announcing results of the UN 2007 World
Robotics Survey); Greying Japan Plans Robonurses in Five Years, Agence France-
Presse, Mar. 25, 2009 ("The trade ministry expects Japan's robotics market to grow to 6.2
trillion yen (63.5 billion dollars) in 2025 from 70 million yen last year.").
150. Big Robot, supra note 147, at 3.
15 1. Id.
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Personal robots are already turning up in dozens of private and
public contexts. Robotic toys are immensely popular.15 2 In Japan, robots
assist shoppers to purchase clothing.'5 3 The Tokyo University of Science
has had a robotic receptionist in its lobby for several years. According to
press coverage of a recent conference on robotics and business,
"companies demonstrated a robot firefighter, gardener, receptionist, tour
guide and security guard." 5 4 The computer chip manufacturer Intel "has
developed a mobile robot called Herb, the Home Exploring Robotic
Butler. Herb can recognize faces and carry out generalized commands
such as 'please clean this mess."'s
B. The Media Equation
Social devices are cropping up everywhere; these devices have a
measurable effect on people. Specifically, we tend to react to human-
like machines and programs as though they were actually human. As
this section documents, our brains often cannot tell the difference
between fake people and real ones-even though we know,
intellectually, that the "person" we're interacting with is not complete or
real. We still react to it the same way, right down to our physiological
response.156
According to the prevailing explanation, humans are over-attuned to
other people so as to maximize the evolutionary advantage of society.
Moreover, we evolved at a time when anything that looked human was
human, and our brains are still hardwired to see the world that way. 58
152. The Toys R Us "hotlist" for 2009, for instance, is overwhelmingly comprised of
robotic toys. See Toys R Us, http://www.toysrus.com/family/index.jsp?categoryld=3813
602 (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
153. Danielle Demetriou, Robot Shopping Assistants Help Shoppers in Japan, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 2, 2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/asia/japan/3541568/Robot-shopping-assistants-help-shoppers-in-Japan.html.
154. Robert Boyd, Robots are narrowing the gap with humans, MCCLATCHY
NEWSPAPERS, Apr. 27, 2009, available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/staff/
robert -boyd/story/66530.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., M. Slater et al., Analysis of Physiological Responses to Social
Situations in an Immersive Virtual Environment, 15 PRESENCE: TELEOPERATORS &
VIRTUAL ENVIRON. 553 (2006).
157. See EKBIA, supra note 104, at 310; Jane Walker et al., Using a Human Face in
an Interface, HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYs., Apr. 24-28, 1994, at 85 ("Infants are
born with information about the structure of faces; at birth infants exhibit preferences for
face-like patterns over others."); MacDorman & Ishigaru, supra note 27, at 318-19
("Homo sapiens may have a genetic predisposition for recognizing faces, [further] honed
by expertise developed over a lifetime.... Regardless of its origins, however, human
expertise with hands, faces, and facial expressions is automatically applied to expressive
machines that closely resemble people.") (emphasis in original).
158. THE MEDIA EQUATION, supra note 14, at 12.
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The ability to manipulate symbols, the presence of eyes, voices, or
gestures, and the appearance of self-directed movement all trigger a
powerful recognition response, little mitigated by the intellectual
awareness that we're dealing with an object. In short, "people are not
evolved to twentieth-century technology. The human brain evolved in a
world in which only humans exhibited rich social behaviors, and a world
in which all perceived objects were real physical objects." 59
One can be skeptical of the exact mechanism, but there is enormous
evidence of the phenomenon itself within multiple disciplines. Reactions
to social machines and other proxies for people (like cameras or
microphones) have been methodically tested by psychologists,
sociologists, and others interested in human-machine interaction. They
range from simple psychological arousal, i.e., the state of being alert to
the presence of another, to measurable changes in behavior and reported
attitude. They are often subconscious and occur irrespective of our
familiarity with technology. And they include the feeling of being
observed or evaluated.
1. Computers as Social Actors
Computer scientists working in artificial intelligence have long
referred to the "ELIZA effect,"1 6 0 after Weizenbaum's computer program
designed to mimic psychoanalysis by engaging users in a credible
dialogue using the "Rogerian technique of encouraging patients to keep
talking."16 ' ELIZA asked users text-based questions and, where it did
not have an adequate response, inserted ambiguous fillers.162 The ELIZA
effect refers to the perception by observers that an Al program that
mimics people is more complex than its programming would suggest. 163
According to Weizenbaum, it was his concern over how human users
seemed to over-bond with ELIZA that prompted him to write the
scathing critique of artificial intelligence discussed in the previous
Part.
159. Id. See also WIRED FOR SPEECH, supra note 6, at 3 ("[OJver the course of
200,000 years of evolution, humans have become voice-activated with brains that are
wired to equate voice with people and to act quickly on that identification.... In fact,
humans use the same parts of the brain to interact with machines as they do to interact
with humans."); Woods, supra note 13 ("We can manipulate altruistic behavior with a
pair of fake eyeballs because ancient parts of our brain fail to recognize them as fake.").
160. EKBIA, supra note 104, at 8.
161. WEIZENBAUM, supra note 15, at 3.
162. Id.
163. EKBIA, supra note 104, at 311.
164. WEIZENBAUM, supra note 15, at 3.
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Communications scholars in a certain mold have developed an
entire sub-discipline devoted to the study of how people react to
machines, known as "computers as social actors theory" (or "CASA").165
Though computers have been thought to be merely a medium through
which communications are transmitted, the CASA theory ...
proposes that people actually engage in the same kinds of social
responses that they use with humans. This theory is also supported
by numerous experiments on computer voice interfaces.... These
social responses to people and to computers are automatic and largely
-166
unconscious.
CASA pioneers Clifford Nass and Byron Reeves relay years of
research in the influential 1996 book, The Media Equation.167 Their
method consists largely of reproducing experiments concerning known
human behaviors toward other humans and then substituting computer
agents for one set of people.' 68 In this way, Reeves and Nass show that
computers that evidence social characteristics have a similar, or, in some
case, the exact same, effect on humans. Computers programmed to be
polite, or to evidence certain personalities, have profound effects on the
politeness, acceptance, and other behavior of test subjects.169 Humans
respond to flattery and criticism from computers, and rate their
experiences with computers more highly if the computer has a similar
'personality' (e.g., submissive) to their own.170 The results applied to
people of all ages and of diverse backgrounds, including those with a
familiarity with technology.' 7'
Experiments and studies have reinforced and expanded the
argument of The Media Equation. For example, a team ran experiments
where subjects played a version of a prisoner's dilemma with a
computer.172  The optimal result required cooperation in the form of
successful promise-keeping. 173 Different participants played with
different computer-generated partners, including a dog, a cartoon dog,
and a person.17 4 The experimenters found that "participants kept their
165. Takayama & Nass, supra note 6, at 2.
166. Id.
167. See generally THE MEDIA EQUATION, supra note 14.
168. Id. at 14.
169. Id. at 24.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 252.
172. S. Parise et al., Cooperating with Life-Like Interface Agents, 15 COMPUTERS IN
HUM. BEHAVIOR 123, 126-33 (1999). The prisoner's dilemma refers to a hypothetical
scenario wherein two or more prisoners are being held separately and asked to inform on
one another. Their best case scenario involves staying quiet (i.e., cooperation).
173. Id. at 124-25.
174. Id.
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promises significantly more with the human-like interface agent.",75
"Cooperation increased when people 'talked' with their interface agent,
i.e., discussed their common situation with it, before privately choosing
whether or not to cooperate"I7 6 The use of sufficiently human-like
interfaces "led to cooperation rates statistically indistinguishable from
cooperation with a real human being."077
The phenomenon has also been tested within the field of robotics.
Indeed, observes human-robot interaction student Victoria Groom,
"[r]obots generally demonstrate even more human characteristics than
[computers].... The very nature of robots make them appear even more
like social entities than most other existing technologies and elicit an
even more powerful social response."178 "'People become emotionally
attached' to robots, [claims] Paul Saffo, a technology forecaster at
Stanford University. Two-thirds of the people who own Roombas, the
humble floor-sweeping robots, give them names, he said. One-third take
their Roombas on vacation."179
The more human-like the machine or interface, moreover, the
greater the reaction. Canvassing the literature on human-robot
interaction, informatics professors Karl MacDorman and roboticist
Hiroshi Ishiguro conclude that "[h]umanlike appearance and behavior are
required to elicit the sorts of responses that people typically direct toward
one another," and that "the more humanlike the robot, the more human-
directed (largely subconscious) expectations are elicited."' 80 In one cited
study, test subjects exhibited greater unconscious eye contact behaviors
(fixating on the right eye, typical of human-human interaction) when
engaging with more humanoid robots. In another, Japanese subjects only
averted their gaze (a sign of respect) when engaging with human-like
machines.' 8 ' Groom also notes that "[t]he fewer and weaker the cues of
social identity, the lesser the likelihood that a robot will elicit a social
response."' 82
2. The Feeling of Being Observed and Evaluated
Importantly, the human response to social design also includes the
feeling of being observed and evaluated. Scholars have "documented
that people change how they present themselves when interacting with
175. Id. at 135.
176. Id. at 124.
177. Parise, supra note 172, at 135.
178. Groom, supra note 101, at 325.
179. Boyd, supra note 154.
180. MacDorman & Ishiguro, supra note 27, at 309.
181. Id. at 316.
182. Groom, supra note 101, at 326.
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human-like interface agents in comparison with a text interface."
Specifically, people "present[] themselves in a more positive light and
modifly] how much they reveal[] about themselves."' 84 They also give
more, cheat less, and perform differently on skill tests.
One study in the CASA tradition began with the observation that the
''mere presence of another human being can influence a person's
behavior substantially."185  It creates a condition of psychological
arousal186 that "leads people to attend more to the social situation and
may increase evaluation apprehension and task motivation.. . . The
presence of other people generally also leads people to present
themselves in a positive light."l 87 For instance, face-to-face interviews
"elicit fewer reports of socially undesirable behavior" than other
interview methods.188
Based on this well-grounded assumption, the team designed a
computer-based experiment around a number of hypotheses. First, they
postulated that "[p]eople will present themselves in a more positive light
when interacting with a talking-face display than when interacting with a
text display." 8 9 Second, they postulated that "[p]eople will be more
guarded in their revelations to a talking-face display than to a text
display."' 90
Their experiment confirmed these hypotheses. Subjects were told
that they were to test a new career guidance computer program
consisting of a survey and report. Half of the subjects were given a
standard text-based interface, the other an interface that spoke out loud
and looked like a person. Throughout the experiment, the team took
pains to "ensure that subjects knew that the face was simulated and that
no real human being would see their responses" and found evidence that
their efforts in this regard were successful.' 9' Nevertheless, students in
the "face condition" were more aroused, presented themselves more
positively, and offered less in response to the counselor program's
questions than those in the text condition. They also took longer to
respond and skipped particular parts of the survey, suggesting to the team
that "they were avoiding certain personal questions."' 92
183. Parise, supra note 172, at 124.
184. Id.
185. Sproull, supra note 11, at 101.
186. The authors define arousal as "a measure of relaxation and assurance." Id. at
112.
187. Id. at 101.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Sproull, supra note 11, at 102.
191. Id. at 117.
192. Id. at 113.
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Raoul Rickenberg and Byron Reeves conducted a study of how
introducing an animated character affected individuals as they performed
problem-solving tasks on two websites modeled on those of Charles
Schwab and Dell Computer. 193 Some subjects performed the tasks with
no animated character present, others with an "idle" character at the
bottom right of the screen that "generally appeared to be preoccupied
with reading a book."l9 4 A third set of subjects performed the tasks with
a character that appeared to take an interest in their every move.' 95
Rickenberg and Reeves found that the mere presence of the idle
character raised levels of user anxiety, but that anxiety was most
pronounced where the character appeared to be monitoring the subject.196
They also found that subjects were able to perform fewer tasks in the
monitored condition than in either the idle or no character scenario. 9 7
Interestingly, subjects reported "trusting" the websites more when the
character was present, and the most when the character monitored
them.198
In yet another study, Catherine Zanbaka and her colleagues at UNC
Charlotte tested the effect of placing a person or a projection of a virtual
person in the same room as a subject performing simple and complex
math.199 They found that participants performed significantly better
overall when they were alone than in the presence-perceived or
actual-of another person.2 00 Subjects performed simple tasks faster in
the presence of others and harder tasks more slowly and with a higher
error rate. 20 1 The researchers found no statistically significant difference
between the effect of a real person over a virtual one.202
Other experiments with anthropomorphic design have yielded
similar results. Terry Burnham and Brian Hare of Harvard University,
for instance, invited 96 volunteers to play a computer game in which
subjects could choose anonymously to donate money or withhold it.2 0 3
By introducing a mere screen photo of Kismet, the robot designed by
193. Roaul Rickenberg & Byron Reeves, The Effects of Animated Characters on
Anxiety, Task Performance, and Evaluations of User Interfaces, 2 CHI LETTERS 49
(2000).
194. Id. at 52.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 53.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 55.
199. Catherine Zanbaka et al., Social Responses to Virtual Humans: Implications for
Future Interface Design, CHI 2007 PROC.: SOCIAL INFLUENCE 1561 (Apr. 28-May 3,
2007).
200. Id. at 1566.
201. Id. at 1567.
202. Id.
203. Woods, supra note 13.
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Breazeal to elicit a social reaction in humans, Burham and Hare
increased donations by thirty percent.20 In another experiment around
donation, subjects consistently donated more where the computer
terminal they were using had eyespots on its screen.205 In yet another
study published in Biology Letters, UK psychologists found that the
presence of a picture with eyes above the collection bin led people to pay
206for coffee on the honor system far more often than a picture of flowers.
Technology need not itself be anthropomorphic, in the sense of
appearing human, to trigger social inhibitions; technologies commonly
understood to stand in for people as a remote proxy tend to have the
same effect. Recent research has shown, for instance, that "[t]he mere
presence of security cameras . . . may not only inhibit unwelcome
behaviors but also have an effect on the extent to which people
demonstrate prosocial behaviors such as helping or being polite to
others." 207 A similar study found that the use of "array microphones,"
i.e., distributed sound sensors that are hard to see, instead of a standard
microphone had a profound effect on people's creativity and willingness
to express themselves.208
As one set of experimenters opined:
A general explanation for these results holds that the presence of
others (whether real, implied, or imagined) makes one a potential
object of evaluation. Awareness of this fact directs attention to the
self, that is, increases self-awareness and triggers self-evaluation
("what impression do I make on others?") and impression
management behaviors, destined to ensure approval. 209
In sum, any technology that suggests the presence of a person-the
ability to manipulate symbols (i.e., language),210 the appearance of
voices,211 eyes, 2 12 hands, 2 13 or the ability to transmit information to a
remote party 214-makes us think that a person is really there. This in
turn triggers a variety of reactions and behaviors associated with being in
the presence of others, which vary with the degree of anthropomorphosis.
204. Id.
205. Judson, supra note 13, at WK12.
206. Id. ("In the weeks with eyes, people paid more often than they did in the weeks
with flowers.").
207. The Eye of the Camera, supra note 9, at 61.
208. WIRED FOR SPEECH, supra note 6, at 164; see also id. ("These findings should
apply not just to array microphones but to any technology . . . .").
209. The Eye of the Camera, supra note 9, at 62 (citations omitted).
210. MacDorman & Ishiguro, supra note 27, at 317-18.
211. WIRED FOR SPEECH, supra note 6, at 4.
212. Woods, supra note 13; Judson, supra note 13, at WKl2.
213. MacDorman & Ishiguro, supra note 27, at 319.
214. The Eye of the Camera, supra note 9, at 62.
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Associated behaviors include cooperation, politeness, and affection, but
also self-consciousness, self-promotion, and changes to what we are
comfortable doing or disclosing.
C. Privacy
Much has been written, and much remains to be, about the
underlying value of privacy. One recurrent theme in the literature,
however, is that privacy helps create and safeguard moments when
people can be alone. Hannah Arendt characterizes a "life spent entirely
in public, in the presence of others" as "shallow." 215  Ruth Gavison
speaks of the "terrible flatness" of a person who succeeds in giving up all
privacy.216 Barrington Moore sees privacy as "an escape from the
demands and burdens of social interaction." 2 17 As Alan Westin famously
wrote in his 1970 treatise, people require "moments 'off stage' when the
individual can be 'himself: tender, angry, irritable, lustful, or dream-
filled." 2 18 Privacy allows for a "respite from the emotional stimulation of
daily life."219 "To be always 'on' would destroy the human organism." 2 20
A related role for privacy is to avoid interference with natural
curiosity, introspection, and self-determination. Without privacy, the
argument runs, we could become a nation of complete conformists. For
Westin, privacy protects "minor non-compliance with social norms" that
"society really expects many persons to break" in pursuit of truth and
self.2 2 1 Julie Cohen argues that "[p]ervasive monitoring of every first
move or false start will, at the margin, incline choices toward the bland
and the mainstream. ... The condition of no-privacy threatens not only
to chill the expression of eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to
dampen the force of our aspirations to it." 2 22 Gavison warns that "[e]ven
casual observation has an inhibitive effect on most individuals that
215. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 71 (1958).
216. Gavison, supra note 52, at 443.
217. BARRINGTON MOORE, PRIVACY: STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 73
(1984), quoted in SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 28, at 76; see also id. at
163-64 (meticulously detailing the role of solitude in daily life).
218. WESTIN, supra note 17, at 35. The Supreme Court of India has also described
privacy as a "sanctuary [where] individuals can drop the mask." SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 28, at 164.
219. WESTIN, supra note 17, at 35.
220. Id. Psychology also points toward the importance of solitude to maintaining
good mental health. There is even some cross-species support for this notion, in that
many animals prefer to perform certain functions in private. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING
PRIVACY, supra note 28, at 163-64.
221. WESTIN, supra note 17, at 35.
222. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1373, 1426 (2000).
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makes them [feel] more formal and uneasy."223 Paul Schwartz has also
written on the relationship of privacy to self-determination.2 24
"Some privacy problems create another kind of harm," notes
Solove, in that "they inhibit people from engaging in certain
activities." 2 25 The potential of excessive surveillance to curtail action,
including free speech, is generally referred to as its "chilling effect." 22 6
The idea is that individuals under surveillance, with or without an
accompanying threat of adverse action, will change their behavior in the
individual instance, or refrain entirely from engaging in certain behavior
for fear of retribution or judgment. 2 27 As Charles Fried notes in Privacy:
"If we thought that our every word and deed were public, fear of
disapproval or more tangible retaliation might keep us from doing or
saying things which we would do or say if we could be sure of keeping
them to ourselves. ... 228
Technology as an independent medium implicates each of these
privacy values. 2 29  It does so directly and measurably, and without
necessarily collecting, processing, or disseminating any new information.
1. The Mere Presence of Social Machines in Historically Private
Places Threatens Solitude
"The benefits of informational privacy are related to, but distinct
from, those afforded by seclusion from visual monitoring," states a
leading text book on information privacy. 2 30 "It is well-recognized that
respite from visual scrutiny affords individuals an important measure of
223. Gavison, supra note 52, at 447.
224. See, e.g., Paul Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, supra note 74
at 1653. See also SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 28, at 94 ("Privacy
enables people to escape from the relentless force of self judgment, which in too
pervasive a dose can stunt self-development."). The absence of privacy is also a common
feature of dystopian novels. See, e.g., GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949) (houses have two
way video screens); YEVGENY ZAMYATEN, WE (1927) (buildings are transparent); ALDUS
HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932) (characters conditioned with a distaste for solitude).
225. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 28, at 178.
226. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) ("In recent years, this Court has
found in a number of cases that constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent or
'chilling' effect of governmental regulations that falls short of direct prohibition against
the exercise of First Amendment rights.").
227. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 28, at 108 ("Not only can direct
awareness of surveillance make a person feel extremely uncomfortable, but it can also
cause that person to alter her behavior.").
228. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475,483-84 (1968).
229. There are of course many more values that privacy helps protect. This Section
deals with only two or three related values around solitude and chilling effects.
230. DANIEL SOLOVE & PAUL SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW (3d ed. 2009).
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psychological repose. Within our society, at least, we are accustomed to
physical spaces within which we can be unobserved."2 3 1
Machines, and particularly computers, go in many places
historically reserved for solitude and reflection. "With the growth of
embedded computers, computing applications are becoming
commonplace in locations where human[s] would not be welcome, such
as bathrooms or bedrooms, or where humans cannot go." 23 2 We carry
increasingly sophisticated computers on our person, in our mobile
phones, MP3 players, and other devices. We rely on computers to work,
play, and connect. It is no exaggeration to say, with artificial intelligence
expert H.R. Ekbia, that "[c]omputers are everywhere." 2 33
As discussed above, robots too are entering the home, the car, and
other spaces at an accelerating rate.234 Whereas once robots were limited
to the factory assembly line or surgical operation table, they are rapidly
become a mainstream phenomenon. Costs are plummeting, and the
market for personal robotics continues to expand.
Imagine a world, hardly implausible in light of the direction of
design, where a technology that we are hardwired to accept as human
occupies most private spaces. Robot toys and "butlers" wander the
home. Voice-driven appliances and lights respond to commands. Cars
interact with the driver-giving directions, warning of problems, or just
chatting. Mobile phones interrupt with advice. Websites are hosted by
avatars complete with personalities befitting the service. Searches for
information feel like a conversation with a real person.
Meanwhile, we constantly feel the presence of another.235 We live
in a state of near constant psychological arousal.236 We get even fewer
"moments offstage," away from the "whirlwind of daily life." 237 We
have more "free time," in the sense of fewer tasks to perform, but we are
seldom completely free of the subconscious sense of judgment or
evaluation. At the margins, this feeling of constant observation threatens
to dampen creativity, 2 38 skew our thoughts and actions toward the
231. Id. at 47.
232. See P.J. FOGG, PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGIES: USING COMPUTERS TO CHANGE
WHAT WE THINK AND Do 10 (2003).
233. EKBIA, supra note 104, at 8. See also Jerry Kang and Dana Cuff, Pervasive
Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93, 94 (2005)
("[T]he Internet will soon invade real space as networked computing elements become
embedded in physical objects and environments.").
234. See supra Part II.A.
235. See supra Part II.B.2.
236. See id.
237. WESTIN, supra note 17, at 35.
238. See WIRED FOR SPEECH, supra note 6, at 159.
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mainstream, 29 and hinder self-development240 in much the same way as
actual ubiquitous surveillance.24 1
This privacy harm is particularly problematic in that it is often
subconscious, subtle, and invited. It is not as though the government is
placing computers or robots in our homes. We choose to adopt the
underlying technology-in fact, we pay good money for it. Privacy law
as presently formulated is ill-equipped to deal with unintentional, diffuse
harm such as decreased internality and solitude.242 First, notice and
consent defeats most privacy cases. Second, the law is reticent to
recognize subjective harms especially where, as here, the particular
privacy harm is not long established.2 43 Finally, because the
phenomenon does not rely on the transfer of information, traditional
privacy protections such as anonymization and encryption offer little
help.
One might argue that humans will adjust to social machines and
software the way the rich adjust to servants, the poor adjust to living on
top of many relatives, or the chronically ill get accustomed to
pharmacists, nurses, orderlies, and doctors. We may, after a time, feel
solitude among machines as we acclimate to their presence.
This claim is not as reassuring as it might seem. What evidence
there is suggests that the effects do not wear off.2 44 Most social effects
from technology occur irrespective of the individual's familiarity or
comfort with the underlying technology.245 It turns out, for instance, that
"familiarity with interactive computers ... removes neither the tendency
nor the desire to interact with them as in a social context." 246
Nor is it clear that people will come to trust computers and
machines in quite the same way as, for instance, relatives and servants-
assuming they do.247 As Charles Fried aptly notes, "[o]ne does not trust
machines or animals; one takes the fullest economically feasible
239. Cohen, supra note 222, at 1425.
240. See, e.g., Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, supra note 74.
241. Cf Arthur Miller, Privacy: Is There Any Left?, 3 FED. CT. L. REv. 87, 100 (2009)
("It does not matter if there really is a Big Brother on a screen watching us. It does not
matter in the slightest. The only thing that matters is that people think there is a Big
Brother watching them.").
242. See generally SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 28.
243. See supra Part 1.
244. For instance, the study in Biology Letters of payment on the honor system took
place over 10-weeks, with no obvious lag in the effect. Batson, supra note 12, at 412-14
(noting similar effects at weeks one and nine).
245. See THE MEDIA EQUATION supra note 14, at 252.
246. Parise et al., supra note 172, at 140.
247. The claim that people were or remain comfortable around servants is largely
anecdotal.
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precautions against their wrongs." 2 4 8 People are equally likely to treat
robots like cameras or microphones, which seldom lend any greater
appreciation of who is monitoring. At a minimum, research would be
needed to conclude one way or another whether we will be able to
recalibrate our notion of "alone" in light of evolving technology.
2. Introducing Anthropomorphic Design into Communications
Transactions Threatens to Chill Curiosity
In a previous century, many of our communications were mediated
by actual people. Telegraphers in the nineteenth century transmitted
messages by hand across long distances. Early telephone customers
shared common lines. To entice consumers concerned about privacy,
advertisements appealed to class: "Telephones are rented only to persons
of good breeding and refinement. . . . There is nothing to be feared from
your conversation being overheard. Our subscribers are too well bred to
listen to other people's business."249
Eventually, telephone calls became person to person through a
dedicated line. "The central switchboard solved the immediate early
problem of having to connect with every other telephone," explains
Irving Fang in A History of Mass Communication, "but the central
switchboard required telephone operators who were not always attentive
and might listen in."2 50 Accordingly, operators were screened from the
ranks of polite and upstanding young women. As David Mercer relates:
"One of Bell's first female switchboard operators, Katherine Schmitt,
suggested that the operators 'must be a paragon of perfection, a kind of
human machine.',,
251
Today (non-human) machines mediate most of our communications.
This resolves the issue of an intermediary "listening in," at least in the
ordinary case.252 As Roger A. Clarke and many others point out,
however, this mediation leads to a distinct set of privacy concerns.253
Computers can record every call and keystroke.254 Internet advertisers
track users as they surf from site to site across a network. Search engines
248. Fried, supra note 228, at 486.
249. IRVING FANG, A HISTORY OF MASS COMMUNICATION 86 (1997) (quoting MARION
MAY DILTS, THE TELEPHONE IN A CHANGING WORLD 15 (1942)).
250. Id. at 87.
251. DAVID MERCER, THE TELEPHONE: THE LIFE STORY OF A TECHNOLOGY 52 (2006).
252. Clearly the government and private snoops can still listen in under certain
circumstances. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2009) (authorizing the interception of wire,
oral, or electronic communications to gather evidence of a crime).
253. See generally Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, in
COMPUTERIZATION AND CONTROVERSY 496 (C. Dunlop & R. Kling eds., 1991).
254. See Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment, supra note 29, at *7; Kerr, Seizures
in a Digital World, supra note 80, at 565.
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record a log of queries, pairing the text of the search with a unique
identifier and other information.255 Meanwhile, all of this information
can be linked and searched. It is in fact this increased capacity to collect,
process, and disseminate that informs most privacy and technology
scholarship.
But modem computer users don't necessarilyfeel as though they are
being tracked. We may know, as an intellectual matter, that somewhere,
someone might eventually pick up our digital trail. But the experience of
searching, surfing, or emailing is actually a lonely one. We're aware of
no operator lurking on the line. In the moment, we don't expect anyone
other than our intended recipient to read our email. We don't expect any
company employee, hacker, or government official to link our searches
with us, personally. Modem communication overwhelmingly feels
anonymous, even when it isn't.2 56
The subjective experience of "having company" entails serious
repercussions for attitude, comfort, and behavior. Reminders of the
possibility of observation, or even the remote presence of another human,
alter what and how we communicate and perform tasks. The presence of
visible microphones, for instance, inhibits creativity and self-disclosure.
The same is true of cameras, even where the subjects are told that the
cameras are off.2 57
As discussed in the preceding section, we have begun to reintroduce
the functional equivalent of humans into our communications
transactions. Search is the gateway to most Internet experience. Its
largest provider is moving in the direction of voice and natural language,
both of which act as strong anthropomorphic signifiers likely to provoke
significant user reactions. Today individuals search alone. We type text
into a box and get text results. Tomorrow's searches will feel like a
258discussion between the user and an autonomous expert.
This in turn has implications for privacy. Specifically, it threatens
an immediate and visceral chilling effect on our information transactions.
Introducing an apparent agent into the "media equation" can measurably
alter self-presentation and modulate disclosure. Changes to interface
technology will suddenly present us with a partner as we explore and
transact. Searching for controversial content, checking embarrassing
symptoms, exploring fringe ideologies, criticizing our institutions, and
255. Tene, supra note 2, at 1440-42.
256. Editorial, Enter Search Term Here, Forever, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2006, at A16
("When people search the Internet in their homes, it feels like a private activity.").
257. The Eye ofthe Camera, supra note 9, at 61-62.
258. See BATTELLE, supra note 20 ("As we learn new ways to interact with
information, it will stop looking like a list of links and will start feeling more like a
conversation.").
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finding information about homosexuality will occur through what we are
hardwired to feel is a person. Meanwhile, no amount of encryption or
anonymization (i.e., removing personally identifiable information) will
lessen the harm because, again, information is not the issue.
3. Our Reactions to Social Design also Create Opportunities for
Better Online Privacy Notice
Thus far this Part has revealed a hidden dimension to privacy and
discussed its potential downsides. But the ability of technology to create
the sensation of being observed also presents a novel opportunity to
enhance privacy. Specifically, placing an apparent agent at the site of
data collection can help line up user expectations about how data will be
used with the actual practices of the entity collecting that data. A form
of "visceral notice"-in the sense that the technique directly conveys the
reality that user information is being collected, used, and often shared-
could help shore up a failing regime of textual notice.
A common complaint among privacy commentators is that users are
not aware of the extent to which companies and others collect, share, and
use their data, particularly on the Internet. 25 9 Governments have in cases
intervened, generally requiring that the company disclose its practices in
writing. For instance, a California law requires "[a]n operator of a
commercial Web site" who collects personally identifiable information to
write a privacy policy and place a "conspicuous" link to it everywhere
they collect such data.2 60 Among other things, the policy must state what
categories of information the website collects, the uses to which it puts
that information, and the third parties with whom the information might
be shared.26 1
The trouble is that few people read privacy policies. 26 2 Worse yet,
many people think that the mere existence of a privacy policy means that
263
companies cannot use or share data in particular ways. Internet
companies also face incentives to word their policies as broadly as
259. See, e.g., Dan Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors
for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001). See also SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL
PERSON, supra note 36; Froomkin, supra note 53; Tene, supra note 2.
260. California Online Privacy Protection Act, BuS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575-22579
(2004).
261. Id.
262. Fred Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION 361 (2006). According to one report, only
0.3% of the users read a website's privacy policy. Id. at 359.
263. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer King, Research Report: What Caihfornians
Understand about Privacy Offline, SSRN eLibrary (2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract-
1133075.
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possible so as to facilitate future innovative uses of consumer data and
avoid liability.264
Human-computer interfaces that introduce an apparent person at the
site of collection may resolve the notice problem in a direct and more
salient way: through a visceral reminder that the data being collected
will be used and shared. Changing from an array microphone to a
standard one, for instance, changes what people disclose.265 So does the
introduction of a camera and/or a warning sign.266 Online, the use of
such techniques short-circuits the need to read lengthy and broadly
worded policies and cuts off the concern that the words "privacy policy"
will imply responsible practice. The overuse of anthropomorphic design
might chill curiosity and interrupt internality, but the use of properly
calibrated social interfaces to collect sensitive data could help line up
privacy expectations with information experience.
Best practices suggest that companies should not store or share data
in the first place beyond what is necessary to accomplish the service. 2 67
But where they do collect and use data, a hard-wired reminder not to
share intimate details could be a useful tool to improve upon the sorry
state of notice. Paradoxically, the use of visceral notice may also have
the effect of improving user trust; research shows that, in addition to
placing users on alert, anthropomorphic design actually increases user
trust in the website.268
III. APPLICATION
This Article has largely focused on ways of thinking. Part I
presented the dominant conception of technology's relationship to
privacy as instrumental and focused on the manipulation of data. Part II
supplemented that conception by introducing a new frontier-interface
experience-complete with additional privacy dangers and opportunities.
264. Google is always looking for new ways to organize and present data, including
user data. Its privacy policy is correspondingly broad in scope, stating that Google can
"combine the information you submit under your account with information from other
Google services or third parties in order to provide you with a better experience and to
improve the quality of our services. Google Privacy Policy, at http://www.google.con
privacypolicy.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2009); see also Yahoo! Privacy Policy, at
http://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/details.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2009) ("Yahoo!
uses information for the following general purposes: to customize the advertising and
content you see, fulfill your requests for products and services, improve our services,
contact you, conduct research, and provide anonymous reporting for internal and external
clients.").
265. See WIRED FOR SPEECH, supra note 6, at 159.
266. See generally The Eye of the Camera, supra note 9.
267. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, FTC Staff Report: Self-Regulatory
Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising, Feb. 2009, 46-47.
268. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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This Part begins to apply the preceding insights to real problems in
scholarship, regulation, and policy. It is meant to be illustrative, not
exhaustive.
Section A begins by analyzing two existing technologies (voice-
driven search and personal robotics) from the traditional privacy
perspective of data manipulation. The section then demonstrates the
value of a further analysis of interface design based on user experience.
Section B seeks to inform regulation by looking at both aspects of the
misalignment of experience and actual practice. This Section explores
warning consumers where a service or device might have a negative but
initially imperceptible impact on their experience and behavior. It also
recommends caution against the excessive use of technology that creates
the perception of observation, particularly by the government.
A. Analysis
1. Voice-Driven Search
As discussed in detail above, mobile Internet search has already
moved in the direction of voice. Users may search for items by speaking
the query into the phone rather than typing it into a text box. This frees
up users to search on the go, even while driving a car. Voice recognition
has come far enough that almost all queries are recognized
instantaneously.
It is clear that this technology implicates privacy in some way. As
with all search engines, users must send potentially sensitive information
to a remote company in order to get back results. In addition to the
search queries themselves, search engines typically collect and maintain
a log of when the search was made, the Internet Protocol ("IP") address
from which it derived, and other information. 26 9 Companies can also
process data across multiple searches in an effort to improve their
services and advertising.
Under certain circumstances, search queries and associated data can
be disclosed to third parties. Internet companies may share such data
among affiliates. Prosecutors or private litigants may subpoena the
data-in an aggregate or individual form-for a variety of reasons. The
information may even be released involuntarily due to a security
vulnerability. 2 70 Finally, users themselves may use search engines to
invade one another's privacy through "search-stalking. 27 1
269. See generally Tene, supra note 2.
270. In a well publicized event, AOL purposefully released use research terms for
research purposes, some of which were linked back to individuals. See id. at 1445.
271. Seeid.at1441.
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Traditional privacy analysis captures each of these dimensions. It
may also recognize specific harms related to the fact that the search
query is spoken out loud instead of typed. Voice adds important layers
to the data that is collected, which in turn permits novel harms.
Specifically, voices are unique and self-identifying.27 2 Unlike most test
queries, voice data could be used to assess the individual's state of mind
at the time of search-did they sound angry, drunk, or sad?-or
demographic information such as their gender, age, and race.273
Traditional analysis, grounded as it is in an instrumentalist view of
technology, probably ends here. Yet voice-search implicates privacy in
other ways, involving the way the user experiences the technology. In
addition to sending information, for instance, voice search may limit
what users feel safe surfing for in ways related to how the experience of
speaking differs from the experience of writing. Unless the user is out of
earshot, he or she may not want to search for local strip clubs or the
proper treatment of you-name-it disease. Even a user who is alone may
refrain from certain searches out of discomfort at giving voice to a
controversial or objectionable fantasy or desire.2 74
More basically still, because of the "automatic and powerful
responses elicited by all voices, whether human or machine in origin," 27 5
the mere existence of a voice prompt may trigger a state of psychological
arousal. The chronic user of voice-based search may seldom relax as
though alone, with measurable effects to her attitudes and behavior. This
travelling, routine reminder that a person is present may interrupt
possibilities for solitude and exert a subtle chill on the user's curiosity-
to the same or greater degree as any technology designed to observe.
2. Intel's Home Exploring Robotic Butler
Herb is a semi-autonomous robot under development by Intel. Herb
is capable of mapping out a house through unassisted exploration and
performing a number of tasks in response to verbal instructions.276
According to its team of inventors, Herb is designed to improve on
272. See ENGAGING PRIVACY, supra note 48, at 22 (noting that "the biometric of voice
recognition can be used as an identification mechanism for vocal forms of
communication").
273. As just one example, imagine that a fresh wave of terrorist attacks by foreign
fundamentalists prompts the Transportation Security Administration to (1) require an
Internet search engine with a voice interface to flag any instance of an accented person
requesting information about explosives, and (2) use the information as a data point in
compiling its "No Fly List."
274. As an experiment, try typing the words "hardcore pornography" and then saying
the words "I am looking for some hardcore pornography" aloud.
275. WIRED FOR SPEECH, supra note 6, at 4.
276. HERB, supra note 93, at *2.
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current personal robots-such as Roomba-that only provide task-
specific functions and suffer from being "unanthropomorphic" (in the
sense of not being well adapted to a human home). Herb seeks to add to
the range of home tasks that "assistive agents" are capable of
performing.277
Does Herb implicate privacy? A traditional analysis will again
begin with the sorts of information that Herb-or Intel-collects,
processes, and discloses. There is a well-understood difference, for
instance, between fleeting events and events that are recorded and
stored.2 78 Thus, were Herb to record data, his presence in the home may
implicate privacy. Herb or, more likely, future Herbs, also may be
capable of sensing events in the home that ordinary humans cannot such
as electromagnetic forces or even changes in brain waves. 27 9 This too
changes the privacy dynamic.
A different and arguably more serious privacy concern arises if
Herb is networked in some way and periodically relays information to
Intel or elsewhere. Privacy and criminal process laws typically regard
the home as sacrosanct, requiring consent or a warrant before entry or
internal surveillance. 280 If, however, the government can access Herb's
sensor feeds in real time or from remote storage, then his introduction
into the home may threaten longstanding protections.2 8' Moreover, at
least one study has shown vulnerabilities in robotic systems that could
lead to privacy problems.282
These are important questions, but they do not present the entire
picture. Our assessment of Herb's impact on the home must include the
experiences of the occupants. Even if Herb does not collect, process, or
relay information in an excessive or irresponsible way, his mere presence
has the potential to interrupt solitude and create the subjective feeling of
being observed and evaluated.
277. Id.
278. See supra Part I.
279. Cf A Roadmap of U.S. Robotics: From Internet to Robotics, CCC & CRA White
Paper, *76 (2009) available at http://www.us-robotics.us/reports/CCC%20Report.pdf
("Human-robot interfaces include ... neural interfaces including physical probes, EEG
(brainwaves), and surface EMG .... ).
280. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. See also SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra
note 28, at 4 (noting the historical importance of the home in privacy law).
281. See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) ("[A] person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties."). The notion that entrusting records to others lowers constitutional protection is
known as the "third party doctrine." See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 223, at 333.
282. See Tamara Denning et al., A Spotlight on Security and Privacy Risks With
Future Household Robots, ACM (Oct. 2009) (on file with author).
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In its current incarnation, Herb does not have a recognizable face.
Herb is more akin to a robotic arm fashioned to a mobile platform. 28 3
This is not to say, however, that Herb lacks anthropomorphic features.
The robot's ability to understand verbal commands, recognize objects,
open doors, move with intention, and gesticulate may all occasion social
responses from people.284
The question, which is an empirical one, is whether Herb's
appearance and actions interrupts the solitude of household members or
otherwise triggers social inhibition or discomfort. It might be that
members of the household adjust to Herb's presence like that of a pet or
a new member of the family. On the other hand, Herb may exist in a
twilight between family and stranger-not unknown, but never fully
known, like some permanent house guest.285 These questions need to be
asked and answered in a thorough privacy analysis.
B. Regulation
On the view this Article has developed, privacy harm is largely a
function of the misalignment of expectation and actual practice.286
Traditional misalignment occurs where information gets collected,
processed, or disseminated to a greater extent than the data subject
understands. But misalignment is also relevant to the extent the data
subject experiences a perception of observation that is excessive or
unnecessary, especially in spaces or transactions historically experienced
as private. This means that new regulation may be necessary to capture
technology's full range of impact on privacy. What this regulation might
be is not clear and the purpose of this Article is primarily to identify the
gap. What follows, however, are some initial possibilities.
If a commercial technology actually triggers non-obvious
discomfort and social inhibition, there is an argument that consumers
283. Id.
284. See supra Part II.B.l.
285. As discussed in Part II.C.3, if Herb does in fact collect data and share data, it
may be better for Herb to take on additional anthropomorphic features sufficient to align
the robot's role as a data collector with the expectations it elicits. See supra Part II.C.3.
The more data a robot collects, the more anthropomorphic should its design be. Id.
286. By "actual practice," I do not mean the fact of monitoring but rather its outcome.
One can imagine a society that is zealously monitored and knows it. Whether this society
is worse off than a society that does not realize it is under observation depends on a
variety of factors, including whether observation is invited or imposed top-down, who
has access to the information it generates, and how that information is used. It may be
that knowledge of observation compounds or even creates a privacy harm in certain
circumstances. Where information will be used against a data subject, however, the harm
is generally mitigated by knowledge, presenting the individual with the chance to protest
or avoid the consequences.
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should be warned. As with any hidden danger, from carcinogens to
subliminal advertising, harmful reactions to social technology of the sort
explored in Part II are not obvious and hence cannot be avoided through
notice and choice.2 87 With some exceptions, we understand when we are
talking to a person rather than to a device. We adopt the technology
voluntarily because we find it attractive or otherwise convenient. But the
literature is clear that our brains react to the technology at a deeper,
unperceived level. It may be worth warning consumers of personal
robotics, therefore, that the presence of the robot may have the same
impact-on physiology, task performance, relaxation, etc.-as the
presence of a person.2 88
We should in general be very wary of the use of technologies that
purposively make citizens feel observed. It is today routine for
transportation authorities to introduce pictures of faces and eyes, along
with a request to assist law enforcement by reporting anything
suspicious, in an effort to combat crime.2 89 As previously discussed, the
U.S. government is well-acquainted with the ability of technology to
substitute for people. 2 90  The government is today funding efforts to
improve such technology, just as it funded voice-recognition labs in the
1970s.2 91
Will our hardwired reactions to social design be used as a behavior
disincentive? In what contexts and to what extent? Given the dangers,
we should apply our traditional First Amendment skepticism of
excessive "chilling effects" to new technologies that leverage our
hardwired reaction to social design. The purposive exploitation of our
natural propensity to behave in the presence of others, coupled with our
inability to distinguish between real or virtual surveillance, could
292
substitute for direct prohibitions on speech or investigation.
Again, these are just two of many ideas. The first step is
recognition by privacy scholars, designers, and eventually consumers and
regulators of the underlying phenomenon.
287. See In re Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984) (discussing the
elements of unfairness as a substantial injury that cannot be reasonably avoided and is not
outweighed by offsetting benefits).
288. We could also require that robots come with a cover, or that companies offer an
alternative to voice and character interaction. And of course the opposite is true; we can
require websites, robots, or other technologies that collect information to reflect a
proportionate degree of anthropomorphic design.
289. See Judson, supra note 13, at WKl2.
290. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 122 to 123 and accompanying text.
292. Cf Arthur Miller, Privacy: Is There Any Left?, 3 FED. CT. L. REv. 87, 100
(2009) ("[I]t does not matter if there really is a Big Brother on a screen watching us. It
does not matter in the slightest. The only thing that matters is that people think there is a
Big Brother watching them.").
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CONCLUSION
There's an old Victor phonograph commercial featuring a dog
showing a great deal of interest in a cone-shaped speaker. The caption
reads "His master's voice" and the idea is that the dog cannot
differentiate between the illusion and the real deal.293
It turns out that we're a little like the dog in the ad. At some basic,
hardwired level, we have trouble differentiating between real voices,
conversations, and faces, and technology that imitates them. And
because of this, we unwittingly adopt technologies with the potential to
interrupt solitude and chill speech without need, in the sense that no
information is actually being used against us. This harm is all the more
dangerous in that it is subconscious, voluntary, and cannot be remedied
with traditional privacy safeguards.
In looking too narrowly at technology's impact on privacy, we may
also be missing a serious opportunity to improve the failing regime of
notice. Rather than merely representing textual information in an
incrementally easier format, we should think about leveraging our
hardwired reaction to technology in order truly to line up expectations
with actual information practice. We should not invite unnecessary
feelings of observation, but we should consider creating those feelings
where there really is a danger that our data will be used and collected in
ways that affect us. We're also missing classic venues where consumer
protection laws or limits on government are commonly thought
appropriate.
This Article opens the door onto a new frontier of privacy and
technology scholarship in and beyond the law. Communications scholars
should think explicitly about "computers as social actors" theory and
other experiments involving the substitution of technology for people as
implicating solitude and free speech. Privacy scholars, meanwhile,
should think beyond the collection, processing, and dissemination of
information when assessing the impact of technology. Finally, regulators
and industry should recognize the dangers and opportunities for privacy
that inhere in our visceral reactions to anthropomorphic design.
293. For a picture and discussion of the ad, see Victor-Victrola Page,
http://www.victor-victrola.com (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
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